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Welfare Act 
Parker C. Eudy† 
In 1980, Congress passed the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act 
(CWA). As a piece of Spending Clause legislation, the CWA imposes upon states nu-
merous conditions in exchange for federal funding. One of these conditions is that 
states must make foster care maintenance payments to foster caregivers “on behalf 
of each child” who qualifies for assistance. Because the CWA does not include a fed-
eral mechanism for reviewing individual claims, foster caregivers seeking to compel 
their state to make adequate foster care maintenance payments have resorted to su-
ing under 42 USC § 1983. However, since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has nar-
rowed the scope of § 1983, holding that private individuals may enforce only consti-
tutional and statutory rights, not benefits, under § 1983. Due to ambiguity in the 
Court’s opinions, a circuit split has emerged over whether a foster caregiver may 
enforce the right to foster care maintenance payments on behalf of the foster child 
under his or her care.  
This Comment argues that the CWA creates an enforceable right to foster care 
maintenance payments under § 1983 by analyzing the CWA’s text and structure and 
by drawing on the context of the Act’s enactment and subsequent legislative history. 
The circuit courts have overlooked several aspects of the CWA’s text and structure 
that indicate Congress’s intent to create an enforceable right. Moreover, the circuit 
courts have almost exclusively analyzed the text of the CWA, ignoring aspects of the 
CWA’s enactment and later pieces of legislative history that provide further signs of 
congressional intent to create an enforceable right. Lastly, this Comment concludes 
that § 1983 enforcement of foster care maintenance payments furthers the legislative 
purpose of the CWA. By ensuring that foster caregivers are adequately supported to 
provide care throughout the entire duration of a child’s placement in foster care, 
§ 1983 enforcement reduces the likelihood that a foster child is shuffled between fos-
ter homes for indefinite periods of time. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In 1980, Congress enacted the Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act1 (CWA), which added Title IV-E to the Social Security 
Act2 (SSA). The purpose of the CWA was to enable states to 
establish foster care and transitional independent living 
programs for eligible children and to provide adoption assistance 
for children with special needs.3 Passed under Congress’s 
Spending Clause power,4 the CWA gives each state the option of 
 
 1 Pub L No 96-272, 94 Stat 500 (1980), codified as amended at 42 USC § 670 et seq. 
 2 49 Stat 620 (1935), codified as amended at 42 USC § 301 et seq. The CWA amended 
Title IV-B of the SSA. 
 3 42 USC § 670. 
 4 See D.O. v Glisson, 847 F3d 374, 376 (6th Cir 2017); Midwest Foster Care and 
Adoption Association v Kincade, 712 F3d 1190, 1194 (8th Cir 2013). See also US Const 
Art 1, § 8, cl 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts 
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creating its own foster care system in compliance with certain 
conditions in exchange for federal funding. Any state choosing to 
opt into the federal program must submit to the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services a state plan that satisfies a list of 
requirements for approval.5 For example, because family 
preservation and reunification were major goals of the CWA,6 one 
of these requirements is that states make “reasonable efforts . . . 
to preserve and reunify families.”7 Upon approval by the 
Secretary, states become eligible to receive federal funding.8 
The CWA also mandates that states with approved plans 
make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of qualifying 
children.9 These payments must be provided to each child’s foster 
caregiver,10 and they are intended to cover the costs of, among 
other things, food, clothing, and shelter.11 Because the CWA does 
not explicitly provide aggrieved parties with a private right of ac-
tion to compel states to provide adequate foster care maintenance 
payments, foster caregivers have resorted to suing under 42 USC 
§ 1983.12 In recent years, three circuit courts have diverged over 
whether the CWA creates a statutory right to foster care mainte-
nance payments that is enforceable under § 1983.13 
The stakes are high for many foster caregivers and foster 
children. With over 420,000 children living in foster care,14 ensur-
ing that states provide adequate assistance to foster caregivers is 
 
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of 
the United States. . . .”). 
 5 See 42 USC § 671(a). 
 6 See text accompanying notes 51–54. See also John E.B. Myers, A Short History of 
Child Protection in America, 42 Fam L Q 449, 459 (2008) (“The effort to preserve families—
called family preservation—was a key component of [the CWA], and the dominant para-
digm of child protection in the 1980s.”). 
 7 42 USC § 671(a)(15)(B). 
 8 42 USC § 671(a). 
 9 42 USC § 672(a). 
 10 42 USC § 672(b). 
 11 42 USC § 675(4)(A) (defining “foster care maintenance payments” and stipulating 
the costs that such payments should cover). 
 12 Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person who, under color of any statute” de-
prives a citizen “of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws.” 42 USC § 1983. 
 13 Compare Midwest Foster, 712 F3d at 1203 (holding that the CWA does not confer 
a right to foster care maintenance payments that is enforceable under § 1983), with 
Glisson, 847 F3d at 380–81 (holding that the CWA confers a right to foster care 
maintenance payments that is enforceable under § 1983); California State Foster Parent 
Association v Wagner, 624 F3d 974, 982 (9th Cir 2010) (same). 
 14 Foster Care Statistics 2015 *4 (Children’s Bureau, March 2017), archived at 
http://perma.cc/R8JY-EWA2. 
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vital. If § 1983 actions are not available to compel states to make 
adequate foster care maintenance payments, foster caregivers 
will have few alternatives to force their states to comply. Another 
remedy for a state’s noncompliance would be for foster caregivers 
to ask the federal government to terminate funding to their 
state.15 Such a drastic move is rare16 and would likely devastate 
any state’s foster care system and ultimately harm foster caregiv-
ers and foster children.17 However, consistent failure by states in 
providing adequate foster care maintenance payments may result 
in multiple placements for more foster children and exacerbate 
“foster care drift” because fewer foster caregivers would be able to 
provide care for the entire duration of a foster child’s removal.18 
These systemic problems severely hinder efforts toward family re-
unification and permanency for foster children.19 
This Comment argues that the CWA’s text, structure, pur-
pose, and legislative history unambiguously affirm that Congress 
intended the CWA to create a right to foster care maintenance 
payments that is enforceable under § 1983. Part I delves into the 
history of child welfare legislation in the United States and high-
lights several pivotal developments that ultimately led to the 
CWA. Part I also maps the evolution of § 1983 actions as a vehicle 
for enforcing federal statutory rights. Part II summarizes the rea-
soning of the circuit courts that have addressed whether the CWA 
confers an enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments 
under § 1983. Finally, Part III argues that the text and structure 
of the CWA’s foster care maintenance payment provisions closely 
 
 15 See text accompanying notes 291–92. 
 16 See Sasha Samberg-Champion, Note, How to Read Gonzaga: Laying the Seeds of 
a Coherent Section 1983 Jurisprudence, 103 Colum L Rev 1838, 1859 (2003) (“Empirical 
data show [that] . . . [f]ederal agency action following state noncompliance is a rarity.”). 
 17 See id at 1839 (explaining that asking the federal government to eliminate funding 
to one’s state program would not ensure compliance and would further “cripple” the 
program). 
 18 For a discussion of the impacts of “multiple placements” on foster children and the 
foster care system, see Melissa J. Dorris, Federal Oversight and Private Actions: 
Maintaining a Balance in Rights Enforcement of Federal Child Welfare Legislation, 23 
Children’s Legal Rts J 23, 32–33 (2003) (identifying multiple placements as one of the 
problems plaguing the foster care system and suggesting that “litigation may be the means 
necessary to achieve broad sweeping reform”). See also text accompanying notes 306–08. 
See also Leonard P. Edwards, Improving Implementation of the Federal Adoption 
Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, Juvenile & Fam Ct J 3, 4 & n 19 (1994) (defining 
“foster care drift” as “the situation of children lost in the child welfare system who move 
from placement to placement without ever achieving permanency”). See also text 
accompanying notes 42–45. 
 19 See text accompanying notes 295–308. 
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resemble statutory provisions that the Supreme Court has found 
create a right that is enforceable under § 1983 for reasons the 
circuit courts have not addressed. Part III ends by contending 
that § 1983 actions further the CWA’s purpose by reducing the 
likelihood of foster care drift and that the context of the CWA’s 
enactment and later legislative history strongly indicate that 
Congress intended the CWA to create a right to foster care 
maintenance payments that is enforceable under § 1983. 
I.  CHILD WELFARE LEGISLATION AND SECTION 1983 
ENFORCEMENT 
Although the origins of 42 USC § 1983 trace back to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871,20 it was not until 1980 that the Supreme Court 
declared that federal statutory rights could be enforced under 
§ 1983.21 However, § 1983 actions had already proliferated during 
the 1960s and 1970s to enforce a variety of federal welfare provi-
sions.22 During the same period, Congress passed significant 
pieces of legislation that made major changes to the foster care 
system.23 Since the passage of the CWA in 1980, § 1983 actions 
have remained the primary vehicle utilized by foster caregivers 
to compel states to provide foster care maintenance payments in 
accordance with the CWA.24 
Part I.A chronicles some of the key historical developments in 
child welfare legislation and the public policy shifts that ultimately 
led Congress to pass the CWA. Part I.B recounts the origin and 
growth of § 1983 actions as a means for enforcing federal laws up 
until 1980, noting that the use of § 1983 actions to enforce provi-
sions of the SSA had become commonplace by the time Congress 
enacted the CWA. Part I.C analyzes several pivotal cases spanning 
from the early 1980s to 2000s in which the Supreme Court devel-
oped a multifactor test to determine if a provision of Spending 
Clause legislation creates an enforceable right under § 1983. 
 
 20 Civil Rights Act of 1871, 17 Stat 13. Section 1983 emerged as part of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1871, “which attempted to deal with widespread legal abuses and physical 
violence, often backed by the Ku Klux Klan, against Southern Blacks and their white sup-
porters.” Theodore Eisenberg, Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical 
Study, 67 Cornell L Rev 482, 484 (1982). 
 21 See Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1, 4–6 (1980); Cass R. Sunstein, Section 1983 and 
the Private Enforcement of Federal Law, 49 U Chi L Rev 394, 394–95 (1982). 
 22 See note 79 and accompanying text. 
 23 See notes 30–41 and accompanying text. 
 24 See Dorris, 23 Children’s Legal Rts J at 28–33 (cited in note 18) (summarizing 
cases in which plaintiffs have sought enforcement of the CWA’s provisions under § 1983). 
1724 The University of Chicago Law Review [85:1719 
 
A. Child Welfare Legislation: A Brief History 
The earliest institutional efforts in the United States to care 
for children whose parents could not adequately care for them 
date back to the early nineteenth century. Led by private and re-
ligious organizations, these efforts resulted in the creation of 
some of the country’s first orphanages and almshouses for the 
poor.25 By the 1850s, the poor living conditions of children in these 
facilities spurred the development of new methods of providing 
care for dependent children.26 Reform-minded organizations, such 
as the Children’s Aid Society in New York, were founded with the 
goal of establishing local and statewide agencies to place or-
phaned children in the homes of families for temporary periods, 
giving rise to the “foster home movement.”27 This Section explores 
how the relationship between the federal government and states 
has evolved over time with respect to administering child welfare 
services. 
Most early child welfare agencies were subsidized and regu-
lated by the states. In 1935, with the enactment of the SSA, the 
federal government became more extensively involved in admin-
istering assistance to states for child welfare services.28 Title IV 
of the SSA provided federal matching grants to help states create 
and manage their own child welfare agencies to care for depend-
ent children living in fatherless and impoverished homes. This 
 
 25 See Kasia O’Neill Murray and Sarah Gesiriech, A Brief Legislative History of the 
Child Welfare System *1 (The Pew Charitable Trusts, Nov 1, 2004), archived at 
http://perma.cc/7K9N-UXVY; Martin Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights 
181–82 (Harvard 2005). 
 26 See Brenda G. McGowan, Historical Evolution of Child Welfare Services, in Gerald 
P. Mallon and Peg McCartt Hess, eds, Child Welfare for the Twentieth-First Century: A 
Handbook of Practices, Policies, and Programs 10, 13–15 (Columbia 2005). 
 27 Id at 14–15. 
 28 Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights at 182 (cited in note 25). 
However, the federal government was involved in other forms of child welfare prior to 
the enactment of the SSA. The most prominent example of the federal government’s 
involvement in this arena was the United States Children’s Bureau, which was estab-
lished in 1912 and which initially dedicated its efforts to reducing infant mortality. Dur-
ing the early twentieth century, “the Bureau expanded its efforts to include research 
and standard-setting in the areas of child labor, juvenile delinquency, mothers’ aid, il-
legitimacy, child welfare, and child health.” The Children Bureau’s Legacy: Ensuring 
the Right to Childhood *28 (Children’s Bureau, Apr 1, 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/CC3E-RF7H. Prior to the enactment of the SSA, the Children’s Bureau 
encouraged states to reform their adoption and foster care laws, and it ultimately played 
a key role in drafting provisions of the SSA related to child welfare. Moreover, it was 
responsible for distributing federal grants-in-aid to states under the newly enacted leg-
islation. See id at *62. See also US Children’s Bureau (The Adoption History Project), 
archived at http://perma.cc/W666-YVT3. 
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federal program is now known as the Aid to Families with  
Dependent Children (AFDC) program.29 However, initially this 
program did not authorize states to use federal grant money to 
provide assistance to foster caregivers even if a foster child would 
have otherwise qualified for aid. 
Federal aid to states did not cover foster care services until 
the 1960s,30 and in the decade that followed, the federal govern-
ment began to play an increasingly prominent role in shaping 
state-provided child welfare services.31 Congress amended the 
SSA in 1961 to give states the option of using federal aid to pro-
vide payments to foster caregivers under what became known as 
the AFDC-FC program.32 In 1968, Congress made the AFDC-FC 
program mandatory for states to receive AFDC funding.33 As the 
federal government expanded the number of children eligible to 
receive reimbursable welfare services, the amount of money flow-
ing into states increased.34 In effect, “By attaching conditions to 
the receipt of considerable federal dollars that paid for the out-of-
home placement of children, Congress has been able to persuade 
every state to conform its child welfare laws with federal law.”35 
The expansion of child welfare services during the 1960s was 
driven by public attitudes about the harmful effects of poverty on 
the living conditions and well-being of children.36 But by the 
1970s, public support for welfare programs aimed at assisting mi-
norities and the poor began to sour.37 This led many lawmakers 
and foster care advocates to reframe policy rationales for expand-
ing and improving foster care not as efforts to address poverty but 
 
 29 McGowan, Historical Evolution at 26 (cited in note 26). See also Irene Lurie, Major 
Changes in the Structure of the AFDC since 1935, 59 Cornell L Rev 825, 826 (1974). 
 30 See Deborah L. Sanders, Toward Creating a Policy of Permanence for America’s 
Disposable Children: The Evolution of Federal Foster Care Funding Statutes from 1961 to 
Present, 29 J of Legis 51, 55 (2003). 
 31 Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights at 183–85 (cited in note 25). 
 32 See Act of May 8, 1961, Pub L No 87-31, § 2, 75 Stat 76. See also Sanders, 29 J of 
Legis at 56–57 (cited in note 30). 
 33 Act of Jan 2, 1968, Pub L No 90-248, § 208(a), 81 Stat 892. See also Lurie, 59 
Cornell L Rev at 827–28 (cited in note 29) (chronicling the legislative changes to the AFDC 
program during the 1960s). 
 34 See Murray and Gesiriech, A Brief History of the Child Welfare System at *2–3 
(cited in note 25). 
 35 See Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights at 183–84 (cited in note 25). 
 36 See Sanders, 29 J of Legis at 57–58 (cited in note 30). 
 37 See Judith M. Gueron, Welfare and Poverty: The Elements of Reform, 11 Yale L & 
Pol Rev 113, 124 (1993) (attributing shifts in the public’s attitude toward welfare programs 
to growing “public anger at a welfare system that seem[ed] to provide people with a long-
term alternative to work”). 
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rather as efforts to “protect” children and to ensure “safety” from 
abuse and neglect.38 This rhetorical shift gave rise to what some 
have dubbed the “child rescue philosophy,”39 which produced new 
federal legislation premised on the belief that many children were 
living in unsafe homes with families unfit to care for them and 
that foster care placement was the best way to help solve this 
problem.40 Regardless of the justifications for expanding child 
welfare programming, legislation from the early 1960s to mid-
1970s invariably led to foster care programs with funding struc-
tures that were “aimed at sustaining children in care and not at 
moving children out of the foster care system.”41 
By the late 1970s, concerns emerged that too many children 
were being removed from their homes unnecessarily.42 Once chil-
dren entered the foster care system, they were often shuffled from 
one foster home to another and subjected to “perpetual states of 
familial uncertainty.”43 Many lawmakers and child welfare advo-
cates began to view this phenomenon, which was coined “foster 
care drift,” as the most pressing problem facing children in the 
foster care system.44 Congress realized that the funding structure 
of previous AFDC-FC legislation was partly to blame.45 
In 1980, Congress passed the CWA to address these mount-
ing issues. In addition to creating Title IV-E of the SSA, the CWA 
transferred the AFDC-FC program to the new title.46 The CWA 
left intact the federal funding mechanism for the AFDC-FC pro-
gram, but it imposed upon states new conditions that they must 
 
 38 See Guggenheim, What’s Wrong with Children’s Rights at 184–85 (cited in note 25). 
 39 See Kathleen A. Bailie, The Other “Neglected” Parties in Child Protective Proceed-
ings: Parents in Poverty and the Role of the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 Fordham L 
Rev 2285, 2290 (1998). 
 40 See, for example, Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act (CAPTA), Pub L No 
93-247, 88 Stat 4 (1974), codified as amended in various sections of Title 42. 
 41 Sanders, 29 J of Legis at 56–57 (cited in note 30). 
 42 See Murray and Gesiriech, A Brief History of the Child Welfare System at *3 (cited 
in note 25). 
 43 Sanders, 29 J of Legis at 61 (cited in note 30). See also Michael J. Bufkin, Note, 
The “Reasonable Efforts” Requirement: Does It Place Children at Increased Risk of Abuse 
or Neglect?, 35 U Louisville J Fam L 355, 357 (1996) (stating that the “average foster child 
spen[t] time in three or four homes”). 
 44 See Bailie, 66 Fordham L Rev at 2289 (cited in note 39). See also Smith v 
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 US 816, 837–38 & n 41 (1977). 
 45 See Martin Guggenheim, Book Review, Somebody’s Children: Sustaining the 
Family’s Place in Child Welfare Policy, 113 Harv L Rev 1716, 1726–27 (2000). 
 46 See Murray and Gesiriech, A Brief History of the Child Welfare System at *3 (cited 
in note 25). 
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satisfy to continue receiving federal funding for foster care ser-
vices.47 Unlike in previous legislation, states were now required 
to implement procedural safeguards, such as active case manage-
ment, periodic foster care placement reviews throughout the du-
ration of each child’s placement in foster care, and long-term per-
manency planning for moving children out of foster care.48 The 
CWA also required states to establish an adoption assistance pro-
gram for children.49 
By discouraging unwarranted removals and encouraging re-
unification and permanent placement in a timely manner, the 
CWA aimed to reduce foster care drift.50 The CWA was largely 
built on the “family preservation philosophy,” which “has as its 
starting point the belief that a child’s biological family is the 
placement of first preference.”51 Ultimately, the goal of the CWA 
was to create stable and permanent living environments for chil-
dren and to avoid lengthy removals.52 The CWA requires that, in 
order for states to receive funding for foster care services, they 
must make “reasonable efforts” to prevent removal of children 
from their homes before placing them in foster care.53 After re-
moving children from their homes, states are required to make 
reasonable efforts to “reunify” children and their families to pre-
vent indefinite periods of foster placement and foster care drift.54 
 
 47 See id at *3–4 (explaining that the CWA was the “first time [that Congress] 
established a major federal role in the administration and oversight of child welfare 
services” and listing several major changes to prior child welfare services under the AFDC-
FC program). 
 48 See 42 USC §§ 671(a)(16), 675(5), 675a(a)(1)–(3). 
 49 See 42 USC §§ 673–673b. 
 50 See Sara J. Klein, Note, Protecting the Rights of Children: Suing Under § 1983 to 
Enforce Federal Child Welfare Law, 26 Cardozo L Rev 2611, 2619–20 (2005) (“In response 
to . . . the growing number of children who were lingering in foster care for many years, 
Congress passed the [CWA]. The CWA focused on reducing the number of children in fos-
ter care by preserving and reuniting families whenever possible.”) (citations omitted). 
 51 See Alice C. Shotton, Making Reasonable Efforts in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases: 
Ten Years Later, 26 Cal W L Rev 223, 255 (1990). 
 52 When a child is removed from his or her family and reunification becomes unsuit-
able, the CWA includes provisions to ensure swift placement with an adoptive family. See 
Sanders, 29 J of Legis at 58 (cited in note 30). 
 53 42 USC § 671(a)(15)(B). 
 54 See 42 USC § 671(a)(15)(B) (stating that “reasonable efforts shall be made to pre-
serve and reunify families . . . to make it possible for a child to safely return to the child’s 
home”). See also David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in Ter-
mination of Parental Rights Statutes: Punishing the Child for the Failures of the State 
Child Welfare System, 54 U Pitt L Rev 139, 158–59 (1992) (“Children caught in foster care 
drift are neither returned to their parents’ home nor freed for placement in adoptive 
homes.”). 
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Like other SSA programs, the CWA functions as a federal-
state cooperative, and states that do not opt into the program 
forgo all federal funding for foster care services. Section 671(a) 
directs that, “[i]n order for a State to be eligible for payments 
[from the federal government,] . . . it shall have a plan approved 
by the Secretary [of Health and Human Services].”55 State plans 
are subject to periodic review by the secretary, and to remain com-
pliant, a state program must be in “substantial conformity” with 
the requirements in § 671.56 The first listed requirement is to “pro-
vide[ ] for foster care maintenance payments in accordance with 
section 672.”57 
Section 672 explains how each state must implement its fos-
ter care maintenance payment program, and § 675(4)(A) defines 
what the payments must cover. Section 672 explicitly mandates 
that “[e]ach State with a plan approved under this part shall 
make foster care maintenance payments on behalf of each child 
who has been removed from the home of a relative.”58 Although 
foster families and childcare institutions are the recipients of fos-
ter care maintenance payments, eligibility for payments is tied to 
the circumstances of the foster child.59 The eligibility criteria 
“closely track[ ]” those of the AFDC-FC program, which are based 
on the financial needs and income level of a child’s parent(s) prior 
to removal.60 Thus, not all foster children are eligible for having 
payments made on their behalf. Finally, § 675(4)(A), which is lo-
cated in the CWA’s definitional section, defines foster care 
maintenance payments as payments intended to cover “the cost 
of . . . food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, . . . 
[and] reasonable travel to the child’s home for visitation.”61 
Because the CWA lacks any mechanism for reviewing 
individual claims,62 foster caregivers have resorted to bringing 
 
 55 42 USC § 671(a). 
 56 42 USC §§ 1320a–1322a(a). 
 57 42 USC § 671(a)(1). 
 58 42 USC § 672(a)(1). 
 59 See 42 USC § 672(c) (defining “foster family home” and “child-care institution”). 
 60 House Committee on Ways and Means, Child Welfare: Legislative History, in 
Green Book: Background Material and Data on the Programs within the Jurisdiction of 
the Committee on Ways and Means *5 (2011), archived at http://perma.cc/CW43-EZ8Z 
(“2011 Green Book”). See also 42 USC § 672(a)(1)(B); 42 USC § 672(a)(3). 
 61 42 USC § 675(4)(A). 
 62 See D.O. v Glisson, 847 F3d 374, 380 (6th Cir 2017); Midwest Foster Care and 
Adoption Association v Kincade, 712 F3d 1190, 1202 (8th Cir 2013); California State Foster 
Parent Association v Wagner, 624 F3d 974, 982 (9th Cir 2010). The only exceptions are 42 
USC § 671(a)(18)(A), which prohibits states from “deny[ing] to any person the opportunity 
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private causes of action under § 1983 to enforce the right to foster 
care maintenance payments.63 In some cases, foster caregivers 
allege that their state has failed to make payments even though 
their foster child meets the eligibility requirements.64 In others, 
foster caregivers may receive foster care maintenance payments 
but allege that the payments inadequately cover the costs 
enumerated in § 675(4)(A).65 While some courts have authorized 
foster caregivers to sue under § 1983 to compel their state to 
comply with § 672 and § 675(4), other courts have found that the 
statutory language and structure of these provisions foreclose 
§ 1983 actions.66 
B. From Implied Causes of Action to § 1983 Actions 
The Court’s § 1983 doctrine underwent massive changes 
around the same time the CWA was enacted, and it has continued 
to evolve ever since. Section 1983 imposes liability on any “person 
who, under color of any statute” deprives a citizen “of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.”67 
The Supreme Court did not affirm the availability of § 1983 ac-
tions for plaintiffs alleging violations of constitutional rights until 
1961.68 As for violations of purely federal statutory rights—in the 
absence of constitutional claims—the Court did not affirm the 
availability of § 1983 actions until 1980.69 This Section discusses 
the rise of § 1983 actions during the 1960s and 1970s, which 
roughly coincided with the decline of implied causes of action. 
 
to become an adoptive or a foster parent, on the basis of the race, color, or national origin 
of the person, or of the child, involved,” and 42 USC § 671(a)(18)(B), which prohibits states 
from “delay[ing] or deny[ing] the placement of a child for adoption or into foster care, on 
the basis of the race, color, or national origin of the adoptive or foster parent, or the child, 
involved.” 
 63 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “private right of action” as “[a]n individual’s right 
to sue in a personal capacity to enforce a legal claim.” Black’s Law Dictionary 1520 (West 
10th ed 2014). 
 64 See, for example, Glisson, 847 F3d at 376.  
 65 See, for example, Wagner, 624 F3d at 976–77.  
 66 See Part II. 
 67 42 USC § 1983. 
 68 See Monroe v Pape, 365 US 167, 171 (1961) (holding that an “[a]llegation of facts 
constituting a deprivation under color of state authority of a right guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment satisfies to that extent the requirement of [42 USC § 1983]”). 
 69 See Maine v Thiboutot, 448 US 1, 4–6 (1980). 
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For over half a century starting in 1916,70 federal courts gen-
erally found an implied private cause of action for a plaintiff in-
jured by the violation of a federal statute or constitutional provi-
sion so long as the plaintiff was a member of the class of persons 
that the statutory or constitutional provision was meant to pro-
tect.71 This judicial power to create private causes of action was 
derived from common law doctrine and provided litigants with ac-
cess to federal courts.72 By the 1960s, courts were frequently read-
ing implied causes of action into federal laws in which an express 
right was absent as a means of guaranteeing that statutes were 
implemented effectively.73 In 1964, the Supreme Court reaffirmed 
the power of courts to fashion private remedies for the violation 
of federal statutes, holding that “it is the duty of the courts” to 
provide “remedies as are necessary to make effective the congres-
sional purpose” of federal laws.74 And again, in 1975, the Supreme 
Court affirmed that courts could read implied causes of action 
into federal statutes and enunciated a four-part test for determin-
ing whether a statute creates an implied right of action.75 
Over the course of several cases in the late 1970s,76 the  
Supreme Court became increasingly reluctant to find implied 
 
 70 Sunstein, 49 U Chi L Rev at 412–13 (cited in note 21). For the case in which the 
federal doctrine of implied rights of action originated, see Texas & Pacific Railway v 
Rigsby, 241 US 33, 39 (1916) (“A disregard of . . . the statute is a wrongful act, and where 
it results in damage to one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted, 
the right to recover the damages from the party in default is implied.”). 
 71 See John H. Bauman, Implied Causes of Action in the State Courts, 30 Stan L Rev 
1243, 1243 (1978) (stating that the function of “[t]he implied cause of action doctrine [was 
to] allow[ ] courts to create civil remedies without express legislative permission”); Tamar 
Frankel, Implied Rights of Action, 67 Va L Rev 553, 555–56 (1981) (discussing the judicial 
power to create private rights of action). 
 72 Sunstein, 49 U Chi L Rev at 411–12 (cited in note 21) (citations omitted): 
At common law, private persons injured by violation of state statutes were gen-
erally permitted to bring suit in state court to seek redress if they belonged to 
the class of persons the statute was designed to protect. The federal courts, ex-
ercising the common law powers recognized in Swift v Tyson, used this rationale 
to create private rights of action for violations of federal laws. 
 73 See Patrick B. Fazzone, Comment, Implied Rights of Action in Federal Legislation: 
Harmonization within the Statutory Scheme, 1980 Duke L J 928, 930 (describing the “lib-
eral approach” of courts during this time). 
 74 J.I. Case Co v Borak, 377 US 426, 433 (1975). 
 75 See Cort v Ash, 422 US 66, 78 (1975). 
 76 See, for example, Touche Ross & Co v Redington, 442 US 560, 570 (1979) (finding 
that § 17(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 implied no private cause of action); 
Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc v Lewis, 444 US 11, 19–24 (1979) (finding that one 
provision of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 implied a private cause of action but that 
other provisions merely proscribed certain state actions without implying a private cause 
of action). See also Sunstein, 49 U Chi L Rev at 413 (cited in note 21) (explaining that, in 
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causes of action under federal statutes due to its “concern with 
the separation-of-powers aspects of such implied remedies.”77 
Meanwhile, claims for violations of constitutional rights brought 
under § 1983 proliferated.78 Many plaintiffs sought redress in fed-
eral court under § 1983 for state violations of various provisions 
of the SSA, including provisions pertaining to foster payments 
through the AFDC-FC program.79 Although cases during this pe-
riod typically included constitutional claims, which “provid[ed] a 
jurisdictional base, [ ] the statutory claims were allowed to go for-
ward, and were decided on the merits, under the court’s pendent 
jurisdiction.”80 
The Supreme Court’s § 1983 doctrine reached a tipping point 
in 1980, when the Court held that § 1983 “broadly encompasses 
violations of federal statutory as well as constitutional law.”81 In 
Maine v Thiboutot,82 the Court authorized two parents, who had 
eight children, to pursue a § 1983 action to sue the Maine  
Department of Human Services for withholding AFDC benefits to 
which they were entitled.83 The Court drew support from a line of 
§ 1983 cases involving claims that alleged violations of both con-
stitutional rights and statutory rights created by the SSA.84 The 
Court noted that “§ 1983 was necessarily the exclusive statutory 
cause of action because . . . the SSA affords no private right of 
action” on its own.85 The Court refused to limit the scope of § 1983 
 
the late 1970s, the Supreme Court “sharply restricted the availability of private rights of 
action, effectively abandoning the approach of Borak and Cort”). 
 77 See Sunstein, 49 U Chi L Rev at 413–15 (cited in note 21). See also Richard B. 
Stewart and Cass R. Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 Harv L Rev 1193, 
1207 (1982) (explaining that implied “private rights of action may usurp [an] agency’s re-
sponsibility for regulatory implementation, decrease legislative control over the nature 
and amount of enforcement activity, and force courts to determine in the first instance the 
meaning of a regulatory statute”); Bauman, 30 Stan L Rev at 1243 (cited in note 71) (“On 
the one hand, an implied cause of action may further legislative goals by relieving the 
burden placed on overworked or indifferent administrators. On the other hand, an improp-
erly implied cause of action may frustrate the legislature’s purpose by circumventing bu-
reaucratic expertise or prosecutorial discretion.”).  
 78 See Note, Developments in the Law—Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 Harv L Rev 
1133, 1172 (1977). 
 79 See, for example, Quern v Mandley, 436 US 725, 729 & n 3 (1978); Hagans v 
Lavine, 415 US 528, 531–33 (1974); Carter v Stanton, 405 US 669, 670 (1972); Miller v 
Youakim, 440 US 125, 133–34 (1979). 
 80 Thiboutot, 448 US at 5–6. 
 81 Id at 4. 
 82 448 US 1 (1980). 
 83 Id at 3–4. 
 84 Id at 6 (collecting cases). See also text accompanying note 79. 
 85 Thiboutot, 448 US at 6. 
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protections “to some subset of laws” and found that § 1983 ex-
pressly provides a private cause of action for plaintiffs to enforce 
rights created by any federal law,86 including Spending Clause 
legislation such as the SSA and its subsequent amendments.87 
C. Section 1983 Enforcement following Thiboutot 
Thiboutot did not articulate a precise standard for determin-
ing whether a statute creates a right that is privately enforceable 
under § 1983, and it was only through subsequent Supreme Court 
decisions that a test began to emerge. In Pennhurst State School 
and Hospital v Halderman,88 one year after Thiboutot, the Court 
provided some guidance while slightly narrowing the scope of 
§ 1983 actions. The Court held that Spending Clause legislation 
“is much in the nature of a contract,” and hence there can “be no 
knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions or is 
unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”89 According to the 
Court, if there is no “language suggesting that [a statutory provi-
sion represents] a ‘condition’ for the receipt of federal funding,” 
then the provision does not create a right that is enforceable un-
der § 1983.90 Thus, the Pennhurst Court qualified Thiboutot by 
stressing that a provision of Spending Clause legislation may be 
enforced via § 1983 only if the provision is tied to federal funding. 
But with the exception of Pennhurst, the Court took a liberal ap-
proach toward § 1983 actions during the 1980s. 
Part I.C.1 analyzes the Court’s initial approach to § 1983 en-
forcement, which was relatively favorable to plaintiffs alleging vi-
olations of a statutory right. By the 1990s, the Supreme Court 
began chipping away at the availability of § 1983 actions.91 
Part I.C.2 examines this shift, which began with the one case in 
which the Supreme Court has analyzed § 1983 enforceability of a 
provision of the CWA. Part I.C.3 discusses the Court’s more re-
cent and narrow approach to finding an enforceable statutory 
right, focusing especially on the Court’s attempts to clarify the 
 
 86 Id at 4. 
 87 See id at 22 (Powell dissenting) (“In practical effect, today’s decision means that 
state and local governments, officers, and employees now may face liability whenever a 
person believes he has been injured by the administration of any federal-state cooperative 
program.”) (citations omitted). 
 88 451 US 1 (1981). 
 89 Id at 17. 
 90 Id at 13. 
 91 See Samberg-Champion, 103 Colum L Rev at 1841 (cited in note 16). 
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confusion caused by past § 1983 cases.92 However, this confusion 
persists today, and it strikes at the core of the circuit split that 
this Comment seeks to resolve. 
1. The Supreme Court took a liberal approach toward 
§ 1983 enforcement in the 1980s. 
Pennhurst was followed by a brief detour of expansive § 1983 
enforcement that lasted until the early 1990s.93 In two cases dur-
ing this period, the Supreme Court upheld the enforceability of 
statutory provisions under § 1983.94 Both of these decisions rep-
resented an initially “liberal standard” under which the Court 
generally viewed federal statutes that benefitted the plaintiff as 
enforceable under § 1983.95 So long as a provision of Spending 
Clause legislation was “phrased in terms benefiting” the plaintiff 
and used mandatory and specific language, the Court appeared 
willing to uphold the enforceability of a provision under § 1983.96 
These two cases have not been overruled, and lower courts have 
relied extensively on both to find rights within other statutes that 
are enforceable under § 1983.97 
First, in Wright v City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing 
Authority,98 the Court held that tenants in a low income housing 
project could bring a § 1983 action against their city’s public hous-
ing authority for overcharging them for rent in violation of the 
Brook Amendment of the Housing Act of 1937,99 a piece of Spending 
Clause legislation.100 The Brook Amendment required that “[a] 
family shall pay as rent for a dwelling unit assisted under this 
chapter” an amount not to exceed a prescribed portion of the fam-
ily’s income.101 The provision was located within a section titled 
“Rental payments”102 and a subsection titled “Families included; 
 
 92 See note 145 and accompanying text. 
 93 See Nicole Huberfield, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983 
Enforcement, and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 UC Davis L Rev 413, 430 (2008). 
 94 See generally Wilder v Virginia Hospital Association, 496 US 498 (1990); Wright v 
City of Roanoke Redevelopment and Housing Authority, 479 US 418 (1987). 
 95 Bradford C. Mank, Suing under 1983: The Future after Gonzaga University v. Doe, 
39 Houston L Rev 1417, 1445 (2003). 
 96 Wilder, 496 US at 510. 
 97 See notes 214–16 and accompanying text. 
 98 479 US 418 (1987). 
 99 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1969, Pub L No 91-152, § 213(a), 83 Stat 
379, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1437a(a). 
 100 Wright, 479 US at 430.  
 101 Id at 420 n 2, citing 42 USC § 1437a(a). 
 102 42 USC § 1437a. 
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amount.”103 According to the Court, the language of the provision 
indicated that the limits on rental payments were “mandatory” and 
that Congress’s “intent to benefit tenants [was] undeniable.”104 
Moreover, the Court noted that the legislative history indicated 
that private actions were to be “anticipated.”105 
Second, in Wilder v Virginia Hospital Association,106 the  
Supreme Court held that the Boren Amendment to the Medicaid 
Act107 provided medical providers with an enforceable right under 
§ 1983 to medical service reimbursements that were “reasonable 
and adequate.”108 Like the Brook Amendment at issue in Wright, 
the Boren Amendment was also a piece of Spending Clause legis-
lation. It mandated that for states to receive federal funds, they 
needed to submit and have approved medical assistance plans 
that “provide[d] . . . for payment . . . of the hospital services, nurs-
ing facility services, and services in an intermediate care facility 
. . . through the use of rates . . . which the State [found] . . . [were] 
reasonable and adequate.”109 The Court found that the language 
of the statute left “little doubt that health care providers [were] 
the intended beneficiaries of the Boren Amendment” because they 
were the recipients of the payments.110 Moreover, because the 
statutory provision prescribed an action states “must” take, it im-
posed a “binding obligation” on states.111 Thus, the Court found 
that § 1983 actions were available to medical care providers to 
enforce their right to adequate payments for the medical services 
they provided. 
In both Wright and Wilder, the Court observed that there are 
only two “exceptions to [the] rule” that § 1983 provides private in-
dividuals with a cause of action for violations of a federal law.112 
First, § 1983 actions are unavailable to enforce statutes that fore-
close enforcement, either explicitly or implicitly.113 While statutory 
 
 103 42 USC § 1437a(a). 
 104 Wright, 479 US at 430. 
 105 Id at 425. 
 106 496 US 498 (1990). 
 107 See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub L No 100-203, § 4112, 101 
Stat 1330, codified as amended at 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A). 
 108 Wilder, 496 US at 510. 
 109 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988). 
 110 Wilder, 496 US at 510. 
 111 Id at 512. 
 112 Id at 508; Wright, 479 US at 423. 
 113 See Wilder, 496 US at 520–21, citing Middlesex County Sewage Authority v 
National Sea Clammers Association, 453 US 1, 20 (1981). See also Wright, 479 US at 423. 
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text that explicitly forecloses private enforcement is fairly straight-
forward, implicit foreclosure is less so. The Court has explained 
that, when a statutory provision includes an elaborate administra-
tive scheme or an enforcement mechanism for federal review of in-
dividual claims, courts may infer that Congress intended for pri-
vate enforcement under § 1983 to be incompatible with 
administrative enforcement and thus unavailable.114 The second 
and more fundamental exception to § 1983 enforcement of a federal 
law is if “the statute [does] not create enforceable rights.”115 Accord-
ing to the Court, “Section 1983 speaks in terms of ‘rights, privi-
leges, or immunities,’ not violations of federal law.’”116 
In Wright and Wilder, the Court found that the statutory pro-
visions at issue conferred statutory rights because they were 
phrased in terms benefitting the plaintiffs and employed manda-
tory and specific language. The Court further found that the ex-
isting enforcement mechanisms in the statutes were not so com-
prehensive as to imply a congressional intent to foreclose 
enforcement under § 1983, with the Wilder court adding that the 
“availability of state administrative procedures ordinarily does 
not foreclose resort to § 1983.”117 Soon after, however, the Court 
began to shift away from the relatively liberal approach regarding 
enforcement epitomized by Wright and Wilder. 
2. The Supreme Court began to limit the scope of § 1983 
following Wright and Wilder in the 1990s, and Congress 
responded. 
In 1992, the Court took a sharp turn away from the liberal 
approach toward § 1983 enforcement in Wright and Wilder. The 
Court analyzed the “reasonable efforts” provision of the CWA in 
Suter v Artist M118 and held that it was unenforceable under 
§ 1983 because it was too vague.119 Invoking the family preserva-
tion paradigm,120 this provision imposed on states an obligation to 
 
 114 See Wilder, 496 US at 520–21; Wright, 479 US at 423. See also Sea Clammers, 453 
US at 20 (“When the remedial devices provided in a particular Act are sufficiently com-
prehensive, they may suffice to demonstrate congressional intent to preclude the remedy 
of suits under § 1983.”). 
 115 Wilder, 496 US at 508, quoting Wright, 479 US at 423. 
 116 Wilder, 496 US at 509, quoting Golden State Transit Corp v Los Angeles, 493 US 
103, 106 (1989). 
 117 Wilder, 496 US at 523 (emphasis added). 
 118 503 US 347 (1992). 
 119 Id at 364. 
 120 See text accompanying notes 51–54. 
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make “reasonable efforts” to “prevent or eliminate the need for 
removal” of a child from his or her home before doing so as one of 
the conditions for receiving federal funding under the CWA.121 
The Court observed that the CWA provides no specific guidance 
for how courts or state agencies are to measure “reasonable ef-
forts” in order to ensure compliance with the statutory provi-
sion.122 Consequently, the Court found that Congress did not in-
tend the vague provision to be privately enforceable.123 
The Suter Court’s conclusion that the CWA’s “reasonable 
efforts” provision was unenforceable due to a lack of specific 
statutory language was in line with Pennhurst,124 Wilder,125 and 
Wright,126 but other parts of the decision were not. Specifically, 
Suter departed from earlier cases because it also questioned the 
enforceability of any statutory provision of Spending Clause 
legislation that is a requirement that state plans must satisfy for 
approval. According to the Court, the CWA did “not provide notice 
to the States that failure to do anything other than submit a plan 
with the requisite features” was required to receive federal 
funding.127 In short, the Court held that the CWA only requires 
states to submit plans that satisfy the listed conditions—and 
nothing more—in order to receive federal funding.128 After the 
state plan is approved, states do not have to abide by the CWA’s 
conditions because the statute does not condition federal funding 
on anything “other than” submitting the plan.129 Because of 
Pennhurst’s requirement that only statutory provisions that are 
conditions for federal funding are enforceable under § 1983,130 the 
Court found that the CWA’s provisions that require state action 
beyond submitting a state plan are not tied to funding and thus 
unenforceable.131 
 
 121 42 USC § 671(a)(15). 
 122 Suter, 503 US at 360. 
 123 Id at 364. 
 124 See Pennhurst, 451 US at 19.  
 125 See Wright, 479 US at 432.  
 126 See Wilder, 496 US at 511–12.  
 127 Suter, 503 US at 362 (emphasis added). 
 128 See id at 358 (“[T]he Act does place a requirement on the States, but that require-
ment only goes so far as to ensure that the State have a plan approved by the Secretary.”). 
 129 See id at 362. 
 130 See note 90 and accompanying text. 
 131 See Suter, 503 US at 359–60. 
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Congress responded swiftly to the Suter decision by amend-
ing the SSA.132 The amended provision, commonly called the 
“Suter fix,”133 applied to all provisions of the SSA, and it provides: 
“[A] provision is not to be deemed unenforceable because of its 
inclusion in a section of this chapter requiring a State plan or 
specifying the required contents of a State plan.”134 Although the 
Suter fix did not overturn the holding in Suter that the “reasona-
ble efforts” provision of the CWA is unenforceable under § 1983,135 
it did purport to overturn all of the Suter Court’s reasoning that 
was not present in prior Supreme Court decisions.136 The practical 
effect of the Suter fix is that the “reasonable efforts” provision re-
mained unenforceable under § 1983 due to its lack of guidance 
and specificity. However, the basic fact that Spending Clause leg-
islation, such as the CWA, requires states to submit plans that 
satisfy a list of conditions before receiving federal funding does 
not foreclose private enforcement of the required conditions after 
states receive approval and implement their plans. 
3. The Supreme Court’s current approach to § 1983 actions. 
The current test that guides the judicial inquiry into whether 
a statute creates an enforceable right under § 1983 is known as 
the “Blessing test,” and it incorporates several of the factors ana-
lyzed in Pennhurst, Wright, Wilder, and Suter.137 In Blessing v 
Freestone,138 the Supreme Court crystallized three factors that 
must be satisfied to find an enforceable right: (1) “Congress must 
have intended that the provision in question benefit the plain-
tiff”;139 (2) “the plaintiff must demonstrate that the right assert-
edly protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that 
its enforcement would strain judicial competence”;140 and (3) “the 
statute must unambiguously impose a binding obligation on the 
 
 132 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ensuring the Supremacy of Federal Law: Why the District 
Court Was Wrong in Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 12 Health Matrix 139, 153 (2002). 
 133 See Dorris, 23 Children’s Legal Rts J at 30 (cited in note 24). 
 134 42 USC § 1320a-2. 
 135 See 42 USC § 1320a-2 (stating that “this section is not intended to alter the holding 
in [Suter] that section 671(a)(15) of this title is not enforceable in a private right of action”). 
 136 See 42 USC § 1320a-2 (stating that the section’s intention is to “overturn[ ]” any 
grounds for determining the availability of private actions to enforce requirements of state 
plans that were “applied in [Suter], but not applied in prior Supreme Court decisions re-
specting such enforceability”). 
 137 See, for example, Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1196; Wagner, 624 F3d at 979. 
 138 520 US 329 (1997). 
 139 Id at 340. 
 140 Id at 340–41. 
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States. In other words, . . . the asserted right must be couched in 
mandatory rather than precatory terms.”141 The Court in Blessing 
cautioned, however, that a plaintiff who satisfies these three fac-
tors has only staked out a “rebuttable presumption” that a statu-
tory right is enforceable under § 1983. A defendant may rebut this 
presumption by showing that Congress foreclosed a § 1983 rem-
edy for violations of the asserted statutory right, either explicitly 
or implicitly.142 
For courts applying the Blessing test, the first factor—
whether Congress intended the statute in question to benefit the 
plaintiff—has proved the most contentious. Five years after 
Blessing, in Gonzaga University v Doe,143 Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist opined that the Court’s “opinions in this area may not 
be models of clarity.”144 Therefore, the Court sought to clear up 
“confusion” among “some courts” resulting from the language of 
the first Blessing factor.145 According to the Court, the judicial 
inquiry into whether a federal statutory provision creates an 
enforceable right under § 1983 “is no different from the initial 
inquiry in an implied right of action case, the express purpose of 
which is to determine whether or not a statute ‘confer[s] rights on 
a particular class of persons.’”146 Thus, the Court imported part of 
the judicial inquiry underlying earlier implied causes of action 
doctrine “as to whether or not Congress intended to confer 
individual rights upon a class of beneficiaries.”147 
The Gonzaga Court held that a former university student 
could not bring a § 1983 action against his university for allegedly 
releasing personal information without consent in violation of the 
Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act148 (FERPA), a piece of 
Spending Clause legislation.149 The Court did not apply the entire 
Blessing test because it found that the FERPA provision failed 
 
 141 Id at 341. 
 142 See Blessing, 520 US at 341, citing Livadas v Bradshaw, 512 US 107, 113 (1994). 
 143 536 US 273 (2002). 
 144 Id at 278. 
 145 Id at 283. 
 146 Id at 285, quoting California v Sierra Club, 451 US 287, 294 (1981). 
 147 Gonzaga, 536 US at 285. See also note 75 and accompanying text. Under the im-
plied right of action doctrine, “[i]n determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a 
statute not expressly providing one,” courts first consider whether the plaintiff is a mem-
ber “of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted.” Cort, 422 US at 78, 
quoting Texas & Pacific Railway, 241 US at 39 (emphasis in original). 
 148 Pub L No 93-380, 88 Stat 571 (2000), codified as amended at 20 USC § 1232g. 
 149 Gonzaga, 536 US at 278. 
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the first factor—whether Congress intended the statute in ques-
tion to benefit the plaintiff.150 The remaining two factors of the 
Blessing test—whether the asserted right is too “vague and amor-
phous” for courts to enforce and whether the right is couched in 
“mandatory” terms151—are presumably unaffected by Gonzaga. 
In its efforts to harmonize its analysis in earlier § 1983 cases 
with that in implied cause of action cases, the Court in Gonzaga 
added additional layers to Blessing’s requirement that a statutory 
provision benefit the plaintiff. The Gonzaga Court drew on sev-
eral factors that plaintiffs were required to satisfy in earlier im-
plied cause of action cases and incorporated these factors into the 
fold of its § 1983 analysis.152 These factors included: (1) whether 
the statute employs “‘rights-creating language’ critical to showing 
the requisite congressional intent to create new rights;”153 
(2) whether the statute conveys an “aggregate” focus on federal 
funding and regulating statewide polices or an “individual” focus 
on the needs and interests of individuals;154 and (3) whether the 
statute supplies a “federal review mechanism” through which ag-
grieved individuals can submit claims.155 
The Court applied these factors to the FERPA provision and 
found that it failed all three. The FERPA provision states that 
“[n]o funds shall be made available . . . to any educational agency 
or institution which has a policy or practice of permitting the re-
lease of education records . . . of students without the written con-
sent of their parents.”156 First, the Court held that the FERPA 
provision does not contain “rights-creating” language because it 
ties a loss of funding not to individual instances of unauthorized 
disclosures of a student’s educational records but rather to the 
use of certain prohibited policies or practices.157 Second, by focus-
ing on the system-wide policies of state educational institutions, 
the FERPA provision contained an “aggregate” focus that was 
“two steps removed from the interests of individual students.”158 
Lastly, FERPA provided a federal review mechanism in which it 
 
 150 Id at 282–84. 
 151 See Blessing, 520 US at 340–41. 
 152 See, for example, Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 288–89 (2001); California v 
Sierra Club, 451 US 287, 294 (1981). 
 153 Gonzaga, 536 US at 287, citing Alexander, 532 US at 288–89.  
 154 Gonzaga, 536 US at 288, citing Blessing, 520 US at 343. 
 155 Gonzaga, 536 US at 289–90. 
 156 20 USC § 1232g(b)(1). 
 157 Gonzaga, 536 US at 287. 
 158 Id at 287–88. 
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“required the Secretary to ‘establish or designate [a] review board’ 
for investigating and adjudicating [alleged] violations.”159 Finding 
that the FERPA provision did not satisfy the first factor of the 
Blessing test, the Court ended its analysis.160 
Courts have struggled to incorporate Gonzaga into the 
Blessing framework in a consistent manner. Although the 
Gonzaga Court aimed to clear up confusion among lower courts 
about how to determine if a statutory provision confers an 
enforceable right under § 1983,161 the decision further entrenched 
disagreement in lower federal courts.162 Because Gonzaga did not 
explicitly overrule precedents and instead relied heavily on 
Pennhurst, Wright, Wilder, and Blessing, many lower courts have 
continued to do the same.163 However, whereas the Court’s 
precedents routinely analyzed whether statutory provisions 
benefitted the plaintiff, Gonzaga stressed that “it is rights, not the 
broader or vaguer ‘benefits’ or ‘interests,’ that may be enforced” 
under § 1983.164 Where to draw the line between rights on the one 
hand and benefits or interests on the other is far from settled. 
II.  FOSTER CARE MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS: A PRIVATELY 
ENFORCEABLE RIGHT? 
In recent years, many foster parents and foster care providers 
have filed actions under § 1983 alleging state violations of their 
statutory right to foster care maintenance payments granted by 
the CWA. Courts have analyzed the relevant provisions of the 
CWA according to the Blessing test and in light of Gonzaga. Cur-
rently, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that the CWA confers a 
 
 159 Id at 289, quoting 42 USC § 1232g(g). 
 160 Gonzaga, 536 US at 290. 
 161 Id at 283. 
 162 See Samberg-Champion, Note, 103 Colum L Rev at 1839 (cited in note 16) (“De-
spite Gonzaga’s assertions that it will ‘resolve any ambiguity’ about the Court’s Section 
1983 jurisprudence, it is as confusing an opinion as the Supreme Court has issued in this 
traditionally fuzzy area.”) (citations omitted). 
 163 See note 216. 
 164 Gonzaga, 536 US at 283. 
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privately enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments 
under § 1983,165 whereas the Eighth Circuit holds the opposite.166 
At the core of the circuit split is how courts, in light of 
Gonzaga, should interpret and apply the first factor of the 
Blessing test—whether Congress intended the statutory 
provision in question to benefit the plaintiff. For this inquiry, the 
Gonzaga court identified the existence of “rights-creating 
language” and an individual focus, rather than an aggregate 
focus, as two of the three elements for inferring congressional 
intent to confer an individual right.167 The third element is 
whether the statute has a federal review mechanism for 
individual claims,168 which all of the circuits agree the CWA 
lacks.169 But only the Sixth and Ninth Circuits hold that the foster 
care maintenance payment provisions contain rights-creating 
language and an individual focus. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits 
applied the remaining Blessing factors, and both courts found 
that the statutory language satisfies all three factors. In contrast, 
the Eighth Circuit concluded that the foster care maintenance 
payment provisions fail the first factor of the Blessing test and 
therefore found that it “need not analyze the remaining Blessing 
factors.”170 Parts II.A and II.B summarize each side of this 
unresolved circuit split. 
A. The Sixth and Ninth Circuits: The CWA Focuses on 
Protecting Individual Rights 
In California State Foster Parent Association v Wagner,171 the 
Ninth Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to uphold 
the enforceability of the CWA’s requirement that states make 
foster care maintenance payments on behalf of eligible children 
 
 165 See D.O. v Glisson, 847 F3d 374, 380 (6th Cir 2017); California State Foster Parent 
Association v Wagner, 624 F3d 974, 982 (9th Cir 2010). Several district courts have also 
found that the CWA confers a privately enforceable right to foster care maintenance pay-
ments under § 1983. See, for example, C.H. v Payne, 683 F Supp 2d 865, 878 (SD Ind 2010). 
 166 See Midwest Foster Care and Adoption Association v Kincade, 712 F3d 1190, 1202 
(8th Cir 2013). Several district courts have held the same. See, for example, New York 
State Citizens’ Coalition for Children v Carrion, 31 F Supp 3d 512, 527 (EDNY 2014). 
 167 Gonzaga, 536 US at 287–88. 
 168 Id at 289. 
 169 See Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1202; Glisson, 847 F3d at 380; Wagner, 624 
F3d at 982. 
 170 Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1202. The Gonzaga Court similarly found that 
the FERPA provision failed the first factor of the Blessing test and did not apply the re-
maining factors. See Gonzaga, 536 US at 287–90. 
 171 624 F3d 974 (9th Cir 2010). 
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under § 1983.172 There, a nonprofit organization representing 
foster parents in California alleged that the foster care 
maintenance payments that foster parents received from the 
State of California failed to cover the costs required by the 
CWA.173 Similarly, in D.O. v Glisson,174 the Sixth Circuit 
authorized a foster parent to sue the State of Kentucky for 
making inadequate foster care maintenance payments.175 
Both circuits spent the majority of their analysis on applying 
the first factor of the Blessing test to the CWA. Comparing the 
CWA to the FERPA provision in Gonzaga, the Ninth Circuit 
found that the CWA is “unlike FERPA” because it has an individ-
ual focus, rather than an aggregate focus, and because payments 
can be made only to an “individual” foster parent or institution 
providing care for a qualifying foster child.176 The Ninth Circuit 
found that the language “on behalf of each child” found in 
§ 672(a)(1)—the provision that requires states to make foster care 
maintenance payments to eligible foster caregivers—rose to the 
level of rights-creating language under this factor because it “fo-
cuses squarely on the individuals protected rather than the enti-
ties regulated.”177 
The Sixth Circuit reasoned that Congress intended the CWA 
to confer upon the plaintiffs a right to foster care maintenance 
payments because statutory language, such as that in § 672(a), 
“phrased in the active voice, with the state as the subject, con-
fer[s] individually enforceable rights.”178 The State of Kentucky 
argued that, when statutory language employs the active voice 
with the state as the subject, the statute indicates an aggregate 
focus on states regulated, rather than on individual rights.179 The 
court disagreed, finding that making the state the subject of the 
statutory provision was necessary to make clear to states that 
they are required to make foster care maintenance payments with 
respect to each individual foster child who qualifies.180 
 
 172 See id at 982. 
 173 Id at 976–77. 
 174 847 F3d 374 (6th Cir 2017). 
 175 Id at 376. 
 176 Wagner, 624 F3d at 980–81. 
 177 Id at 980. 
 178 Glisson, 847 F3d at 379. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See id (“When Congress names the state as the subject, writes in the active voice, 
and uses mandatory language, it leaves no doubt about the actor’s identity or what the 
law requires.”). 
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After finding the first Blessing factor was satisfied, the Sixth 
and Ninth Circuits applied the second and third factors of the 
Blessing test, finding that both factors were easily met. Analyzing 
the second factor, both circuits found that the right conferred 
upon the plaintiffs was not “vague and amorphous” to the extent 
that its enforcement would strain judicial competence.181 The cir-
cuits analyzed § 672(a)(1) in conjunction with § 675(4)(A), the pro-
vision that defines foster care maintenance payments, and con-
cluded that the itemized list of costs therein establishes clearly 
the content of the asserted right.182 
As for the third factor of the Blessing test, both circuits found 
that the phrase “shall make” in § 672(a)(1) unambiguously com-
mands that the payment of foster care maintenance payments is 
mandatory.183 The courts found that, by dictating what a state 
“shall” do “on behalf of each child,”184 the statutory provision could 
not be more mandatory.185 As the Sixth Circuit bluntly concluded: 
“It isn’t optional.”186 Likewise, the Ninth Circuit noted that “the 
State does not seriously contend that the § 672(a)’s language is 
precatory rather than mandatory,” suggesting that the use of 
“shall” could not be reasonably interpreted as imposing anything 
less than a binding obligation.187 
Ultimately, both circuits quickly concluded that the state in 
each case failed to rebut the presumptive enforceability of the 
right to foster care maintenance payments.188 Although the CWA 
requires that states grant “an opportunity for a fair hearing be-
fore the State agency” for the aggrieved,189 the Act lacks a federal 
review mechanism for addressing claims raised by foster caregiv-
ers.190 According to the Ninth Circuit, the lack of a federal admin-
istrative forum for reviewing individual claims “lends additional 
support” to the conclusion that Congress intended to create an 
 
 181 See id at 378; Wagner, 624 F3d at 981. 
 182 See Glisson, 847 F3d at 378; Wagner, 624 F3d at 980. See also Adoption Assistance 
and Child Welfare Act of 1979, S Rep No 96-336, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 15 (1979), reprinted 
in 1980 USCCAN 1448, 1464 (explaining that Congress provided the specific definition as 
a response to “general confusion about what can be called a foster care maintenance 
payment”). 
 183 See Glisson, 847 F3d at 378; Wagner, 624 F3d at 982. 
 184 42 USC § 672(a)(1) (emphasis added). 
 185 See Glisson, 847 F3d at 378; Wagner, 624 F3d at 982. 
 186 Glisson, 847 F3d at 379. 
 187 Wagner, 624 F3d at 982. 
 188 See Glisson, 847 F3d at 380; Wagner, 624 F3d at 982. 
 189 42 USC § 671(a)(12). 
 190 Glisson, 847 F3d at 380–81, quoting Wilder, 496 US at 523. 
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enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments.191 Simi-
larly, the Sixth Circuit found that the CWA lacks a federal review 
mechanism and that the available state administrative proce-
dures do not foreclose access to § 1983 remedies.192 
B. The Eighth Circuit: The CWA Focuses on Regulating States 
Unlike the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the Eighth Circuit in-
terpreted the foster care maintenance payment provision as pri-
marily addressing state compliance, and therefore it found the fo-
cus of the statutory provision to be on regulating states in the 
aggregate rather than on protecting individual rights. Applying 
the same test to the same statutory provisions as the other cir-
cuits, the Eighth Circuit held in Midwest Foster Care and  
Adoption Association v Kincade193 that the CWA does not create 
an enforceable right to foster care maintenance payments under 
§ 1983.194 The Eighth Circuit compared the CWA’s language to the 
FERPA provision at issue in Gonzaga, and it determined that the 
foster care maintenance payment provisions similarly failed the 
first factor of the Blessing test because of its focus on regulating 
states in the aggregate.195 
First, the court found that the CWA’s statutory language falls 
short of constituting “rights-creating” language. According to the 
court, the foster care maintenance payment provisions address 
the states as participants with the federal government within the 
federal-state cooperative design of the CWA.196 Second, the Eighth 
Circuit found that the CWA’s provisions maintain an aggregate 
focus on overall compliance rather than an emphasis on the rights 
of individuals. The court cited the federal compliance scheme lo-
cated in another section of the SSA, which states that the  
“Secretary [of Health and Human Services] ‘must promulgate reg-
ulations for the review of [state] programs to determine whether 
 
 191 Wagner, 624 F3d at 982, citing Gonzaga, 536 US at 289–90 (“The fact that [foster 
caregivers] have no administrative forum in which to raise their concerns lends additional 
support to [the] conclusion that Congress intended to create an enforceable right here, just 
as the presence of an administrative mechanism ‘buttressed’ the Supreme Court’s opposite 
conclusion in Gonzaga.”). 
 192 Glisson, 847 F3d at 380–81. 
 193 712 F3d 1190 (8th Cir 2013). 
 194 Id at 1202. 
 195 Id at 1197. 
 196 See id at 1200, quoting Gonzaga, 536 US at 284 (“The unmistakable focus of 
§ 672(a) and § 675(4)(A) on the states as regulated participants in [a] federal cost-sharing 
program precludes us from finding that these provisions are ‘phrased in terms of the [fos-
ter caregivers].’”). 
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[such programs are in] substantial conformity’” with the require-
ments that various titles of the SSA, including the CWA, place on 
state programs.197 According to the Eighth Circuit, this emphasis 
on “substantial” rather than “perfect” compliance “cuts against an 
individually enforceable right because, even where a state sub-
stantially complies with its federal responsibilities, a sizeable mi-
nority of its beneficiaries may nonetheless fail to receive the full 
panoply of offered benefits.”198 
However, the Eighth Circuit recognized that the Brook 
Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which was at issue in Wilder, 
was also subject to the SSA’s substantial compliance regime, and 
yet the Wilder Court still found the statutory provision to be en-
forceable.199 Thus, the Eighth Circuit reasoned that “a substantial 
compliance regime may suggest an absence of the requisite con-
gressional intent, [but] it cannot by itself establish an aggregate 
focus.”200 Nevertheless, the court inferred that the CWA contains 
an aggregate focus because of its conclusion that each reference 
to foster care maintenance payments is enmeshed within a 
broader statutory framework focused on state compliance and 
federal funding.201 Lastly, the Eighth Circuit conceded that there 
is no federal mechanism for reviewing the claims of foster care-
givers.202 Nevertheless, the court decided that this absence is out-
weighed by the lack of “rights-creating” language and the CWA’s 
“aggregate focus.”203 
In sum, the Eighth Circuit disagreed with the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits over what the Gonzaga Court meant by “aggregate 
focus” and “rights-creating” language. According to the Sixth and 
Ninth Circuits, § 672(a) employs obligatory language to address 
states, and it is specific about what each foster caregiver is enti-
tled to receive from her state for caring for an eligible child. Thus, 
these circuits viewed § 672(a) as having a focus on individual fos-
ter caregivers with the purpose of creating a right to foster care 
maintenance payments. On the other hand, the Eighth Circuit 
 
 197 See Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1194, citing 42 USC § 1320a-2a (emphasis 
added). 
 198 Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1200–01. 
 199 Id at 1201. 
 200 Id, citing Sabree v Richman, 367 F3d 180, 192 (3d Cir 2004). 
 201 See Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1201 (noting that, “[w]here the Supreme 
Court has found individually enforceable rights, they have not been ensconced by refer-
ences to actions that trigger such a funding prohibition”). 
 202 Id at 1202. 
 203 Id at 1201–02. 
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viewed foster caregivers and eligible foster children as less cen-
tral to § 672(a). Consequently, it found that the statutory provi-
sion serves a regulatory function in which the primary focus is on 
overall state compliance for the purpose of receiving federal 
funds. 
III.  ENFORCING THE RIGHT TO FOSTER CARE  
MAINTENANCE PAYMENTS 
All of the circuit courts involved in the split drew on the stat-
utory provisions at issue in Wright, Wilder, and Gonzaga to either 
support or distinguish the CWA, but there are several similarities 
and differences between the statutory provisions that the courts 
have overlooked. Moreover, all of the circuit courts focused almost 
exclusively on § 672(a) and § 675(4)(A), paying less attention to 
the other provisions within the CWA’s structure that shed some 
light on how to interpret the foster care maintenance payment 
provisions. In the circuit courts’ attempt to infer congressional in-
tent to create (or not create) an enforceable right, the courts lim-
ited their opinions mostly to the text, ignoring important answers 
available in the legislative history. 
This Part argues that Congress intended to confer upon fos-
ter caregivers a privately enforceable right to foster care mainte-
nance payments by drawing support from aspects of the CWA’s 
text, structure, and legislative history and purpose that the cir-
cuit courts have ignored. Part III.A analyzes the text and struc-
ture of the CWA’s provisions and, in particular, examines how the 
language of § 672 is more focused on the individual rights of foster 
caregivers compared to other sections of the CWA. Part III.B lo-
cates the CWA within the broader context of its enactment and 
analyzes how private enforcement of foster care maintenance 
payments comports with the CWA’s legislative purpose. In addi-
tion, Part III.B highlights some of the CWA’s legislative history 
implying that Congress intended provisions of the CWA to be pri-
vately enforceable under § 1983. 
A. Rereading the CWA for Rights-Creating Language and an 
Individual Focus under Gonzaga 
The overarching inquiry in § 1983 actions is whether the “text 
and structure” of the statute indicate that Congress intended to 
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create an enforceable individual right.204 A statutory provision is 
enforceable under § 1983 if it contains “rights-creating language” 
and conveys an “individual focus.”205 This Section draws on as-
pects of the Wright, Wilder, and Gonzaga provisions pertaining to 
“rights-creating language” and an “individual focus.” Whereas the 
Gonzaga court found the FERPA provision easily distinguishable 
from the Wright and Wilder provisions, this Section argues that 
the foster care maintenance payment provisions, § 672(a) and 
§ 675(4)(A), are much more similar to the Wright and Wilder pro-
visions than to the FERPA provision in Gonzaga.206 While the 
FERPA provision explicitly references federal funding in the con-
text of states’ policies to ensure student privacy, the foster care 
maintenance provisions lack any reference to federal funding and 
refer only to the exchange of monetary assistance between states 
and individual foster caregivers. 
To this day, Wright and Wilder remain the only cases since 
Thiboutot in which the Court found examples of Spending Clause 
legislation creating enforceable rights under § 1983.207 Gonzaga 
relied on both Wright and Wilder, implying that the Supreme 
Court would still find the provisions at issue in each case enforce-
able today. As the Gonzaga Court noted, Wright and Wilder both 
involved statutes that “explicitly conferred specific monetary en-
titlements upon the plaintiffs.”208 Addressing Wilder specifically, 
the Court explained that there was “no doubt” that Congress in-
tended for the provision in Wilder to be privately enforceable un-
der § 1983 because it required states to pay a “monetary entitle-
ment” to certain individuals.209 Gonzaga’s nod of approval toward 
the holdings of Wright and Wilder suggests that the Court may 
be more willing to uphold the enforceability of a specific monetary 
entitlement under § 1983. As Part III.B.2 further contends, suing 
for damages to recover an unpaid monetary entitlement imposes 
 
 204 See Gonzaga, 536 US at 286. 
 205 See id at 290–91. 
 206 This Part does not focus on the second and third factors of the Blessing test because 
there is no circuit split over how these factors should be applied to foster care maintenance 
payments. 
 207 Gonzaga, 536 US at 280. Pennhurst, Suter, Blessing, and Gonzaga each involved 
provisions of Spending Clause legislation that the Court found unenforceable under 
§ 1983. 
 208 Gonzaga, 536 US at 280. 
 209 Id at 280–81, citing Wilder, 496 US at 522–23 (“Congress left no doubt of its intent 
for private enforcement, we said, because the provision required States to pay an ‘objective’ 
monetary entitlement to individual health care providers, with no sufficient administra-
tive means of enforcing the requirement against States that failed to comply.”). 
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less of a burden on state autonomy than does suing for equitable 
relief to enjoin a state practice or policy.210 
However, as the Supreme Court later explained in Armstrong 
v Exceptional Child Center, Inc,211 Gonzaga rejected the inference 
that Wilder permits § 1983 actions to enforce “anything short of 
an unambiguously conferred right.”212 Armstrong involved 
implied rights of action rather than § 1983 actions, holding that 
Medicaid does not confer implied rights of action.213 Nevertheless, 
circuit courts have recently emphasized that “Armstrong isn’t a 
§ 1983 case,” and thus Armstrong’s implied right of action holding 
is not binding on analysis in the § 1983 context.214 Although 
finding an implied right of action within a statute requires that 
the plaintiff show that Congress intended to create a right and a 
remedy for violation of that right, § 1983 cases require only that 
the plaintiff show that Congress intended to create an enforceable 
right because § 1983 supplies the remedy.215 In the Tenth Circuit’s 
assessment of Armstrong, “[B]ecause Justice [Anthony] Kennedy 
didn’t join Justice [Antonin] Scalia’s Spending Clause reasoning, 
it is not binding” in the § 1983 context—on the other hand, 
“Wilder still is.”216 
Acknowledging the additional hurdles imposed by Gonzaga, 
many circuit courts have continued to draw heavily on Wright and 
Wilder to find private rights of action under § 1983 to enforce a 
variety of Spending Clause statutory provisions.217 For example, 
 
 210 In Pennhurst, Suter, and Blessing, the plaintiffs sued for equitable relief, 
whereas in Wright, Wilder, and Gonzaga, the plaintiffs sued for damages. Only in 
Wright and Wilder did the provision in question confer upon the plaintiffs a monetary 
entitlement that the state was required to provide and protect. 
 211 135 S Ct 1378 (2015). 
 212 Id at 1386 n *, quoting Gonzaga, 536 US at 283. 
 213 Armstrong, 135 S Ct at 1385 (stating that the “sole remedy Congress provided for 
a State’s failure to comply with Medicaid’s requirements . . . is the withholding of Medicaid 
funds by the Secretary of Health and Human Services”). 
 214 See, for example, Planned Parenthood of Kansas v Andersen, 882 F3d 1205, 1229 
(10th Cir 2018). 
 215 See note 293 and accompanying text. 
 216 Planned Parenthood of Kansas, 882 F3d at 1229. See also BT Bourbonnais Care, 
LLC v Norwood, 866 F3d 815, 820–21 (7th Cir 2017) (“[N]othing in Armstrong, Gonzaga, 
or any other case we have found supports the idea that plaintiffs are now flatly forbidden 
in section 1983 actions to rely on a statute passed pursuant to Congress’s Spending Clause 
powers. . . . [H]ad that been the Court’s intent, . . . [a] simple ‘no’ would have sufficed.”). 
 217 See, for example, Planned Parenthood of Kansas, 882 F3d at 1229 (“Wilder still is 
[binding].”); BT Bourbonnais Care, 866 F3d at 820 (noting that “the Supreme Court has 
never overruled its decision in Wilder”); Briggs v Bremby, 792 F3d 239, 244 (2d Cir 2015) 
(noting that Gonzaga does not “undercut the applicability of Wright and Wilder to the case 
before us” because “[n]one of the three factors that the Supreme Court used to distinguish 
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the Third Circuit has noted that the Gonzaga Court “carefully 
avoided disturbing, much less overruling, Wright and Wilder,” 
stressing that “the Court relied on those cases in crafting 
Gonzaga.”218 In addition, the Second Circuit has drawn on several 
factors that the Court highlighted in Gonzaga to distinguish the 
FERPA provision from the provisions in Wright and Wilder, 
including a focus on entities “being regulated rather than on the 
interests of” individuals, as well as a focus on regulating a 
“general ‘policy or practice’ . . . rather than focusing on specific 
instances of” state action.219 The Second Circuit concluded that, 
as long as these distinguishing factors are absent in a given 
statute, Gonzaga does not “undercut the applicability of Wright 
and Wilder.”220 
Despite the changes in the Court’s § 1983 doctrine since 
Wright and Wilder, the statutes in both cases still provide helpful 
examples of the type of statutory language that would pass the 
Blessing test after Gonzaga. This Section posits that the text and 
structure of the CWA’s foster care maintenance payment provi-
sions are more similar to the text and structure of the Wright and 
Wilder provisions than the FERPA provision in Gonzaga. The fos-
ter care maintenance payment provisions convey an “individual 
focus” and employ “rights-creating language.” But these two as-
pects frequently overlap, for provisions that contain “rights- 
creating language” also tend to convey an “individual focus”—and 
vice versa. According to Gonzaga, to contain rights-creating lan-
guage, a statutory provision must include “individually focused 
terminology” such that the statute’s focus is not “removed from 
the interests of [the] individual[s]” claiming an enforceable 
 
the statute in Gonzaga from those in Wright and Wilder apply to the provisions here”); 
Romano v Greenstein, 721 F3d 373, 378–79 (5th Cir 2013) (relying extensively on Wilder 
and Gonzaga and holding that 42 USC § 1396a(a)(8) provides a private right of action 
under § 1983 to ensure that Medicaid assistance be provided with “reasonable  
promptness” to eligible individuals); Bontrager v Indiana Family and Social Services  
Administration, 697 F3d 604, 607 (7th Cir 2012) (“Although we have acknowledged that 
Gonzaga may have taken a new analytical approach, . . . Wilder has not been overruled.”) 
(quotation marks omitted); Sabree v Richman, 367 F3d 180, 184 (3d Cir 2004) (“Gonzaga 
did not overrule Wilder; rather, it explained that ‘Congress left no doubt of its intent for 
private enforcement.’ . . . Neither did the Court overrule Wright; rather, it identified it as 
an instance in which Congress ‘unambiguously conferred a mandatory [benefit].’”), quot-
ing Gonzaga, 536 US at 280–81. But see Does v Gillespie, 867 F3d 1034, 1040 (8th Cir 
2017) (concluding that Gonzaga sub silentio overruled Wilder). 
 218 Sabree, 367 F3d at 184. 
 219 Briggs, 792 F3d at 244. 
 220 Id. 
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right.221 Similarly, to convey an “individual focus,” a statutory pro-
vision must pertain to the protection of individual rights and en-
titlements, not to policies and practices, which would instead con-
vey an “aggregate focus.”222 
1. The structure of the CWA addresses individual foster 
caregivers and state compliance separately. 
The structure of the CWA divides the requirement that states 
make foster care maintenance payments into two interlocking 
sections. The first provision addressing foster care maintenance 
payments is in § 671, which provides that, “[i]n order for a State 
to be eligible for payments under this part, it shall have a plan”223 
that, among many other things, “provides for foster care mainte-
nance payments in accordance with section 672.”224 Section 672 
mandates that each state “shall make foster care maintenance 
payments on behalf of each child,” and it provides greater detail 
about which foster caregivers are entitled to receive assistance.225 
By analyzing § 671 and § 672 side by side, it becomes appar-
ent that each section has a distinct focus. Section 671 has an ag-
gregate focus because it enumerates the practices and policies 
that states must incorporate into the plans that they submit to 
the federal government for approval and funding. All of the con-
ditions in § 671(a) are referenced in the context of describing what 
would trigger a funding prohibition. One could argue that none of 
these conditions alone is enforceable because of the tension be-
tween Pennhurst and Gonzaga over the relationship between en-
forceable rights and federal funding in Spending Clause legisla-
tion.226 On the one hand, Pennhurst instructed that an enforceable 
right must be located in a statutory provision that imposes a man-
datory condition on states to receive funding. If a provision of 
Spending Clause legislation lacks language suggesting that it is 
a “‘condition’ for the receipt of federal funding,” then the provision 
 
 221 Gonzaga, 536 US at 287. 
 222 Id at 288. 
 223 42 USC § 671(a). 
 224 42 USC § 671(a)(1). 
 225 42 USC § 672(a)(1). 
 226 See Section 1983 and the Spending Power: Enforcement of Federal “Laws” *9–10 
(Congressional Research Service, Sept 12, 2002), archived at http://perma.cc/K55M-JS2J 
(describing this tension). But see BT Bourbonnais Care, 866 F3d at 820–21 (finding that 
“nothing in Armstrong, Gonzaga, or any other case we have found supports the idea that 
plaintiffs are now flatly forbidden in section 1983 actions to rely on a statute passed pur-
suant to Congress’s Spending Clause powers”). 
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does not create a right that is enforceable under § 1983.227 On the 
other hand, Gonzaga cautioned that, if the right asserted by the 
plaintiff is referenced only in the context of describing the type of 
state actions required for a state to receive funding, then the as-
serted right is not enforceable under § 1983 because it is intended 
only to direct state compliance.228 
Taking these statements from Pennhurst and Gonzaga to-
gether, we can conclude that, in order to be enforceable under 
§ 1983, an asserted right must: (1) be located in a statutory pro-
vision that constitutes a condition on states to receive federal 
funding to satisfy Pennhurst229 and (2) be located in a statutory 
provision that is not connected to federal funding to satisfy  
Gonzaga.230 All of the state plan requirements in § 671(a) satisfy 
the first requirement above because all of the provisions are tied 
to federal funding, but they do not satisfy the second based on the 
text of § 671(a) alone. Indeed, something more is needed for a 
plaintiff to enforce any of the provisions in § 671(a). 
Some of the conditions that appear in § 671(a), such as the 
“reasonable efforts” provision found unenforceable in Suter,231 are 
not mentioned anywhere else in the CWA. However, some condi-
tions, such as the foster care maintenance provision in § 671(a)(1), 
are addressed in greater detail in other sections of the CWA—
outside of the context of federal funding and state compliance that 
permeates § 671. Section 672 speaks directly to foster caregivers 
who are entitled to receive payment on behalf of eligible foster 
children. Thus, it contains an individualized focus that stands in 
contrast to the more general focus on state compliance in § 671. 
The focal shift between § 671 and § 672 supports the conclusion 
that § 672 provides an enforceable right to foster care mainte-
nance payments under § 1983. 
a) Section 671(a) contains an aggregate focus.  As a whole, 
Spending Clause legislation functions as a contract between the 
 
 227 Pennhurst, 451 US at 13. 
 228 Gonzaga, 536 US at 288–89 (“In each provision the reference to [the asserted right] 
is in the context of describing the type of [state action] that triggers a funding prohibi-
tion. . . . [S]uch provisions cannot make out the requisite congressional intent to confer 
individual rights enforceable by § 1983.”). 
 229 See Section 1983 and the Spending Power at *9 (“‘Rights’ not connected to terms 
and conditions of a state’s spending program may be viewed as free-floating and merely 
precatory, as in Pennhurst.”). 
 230 See id (“[I]f protecting a ‘right’ is included as a requirement of a state plan that 
must be approved by a federal official in order for the state to qualify for funding, . . . then 
the Court may . . . rule that additional remedies are inappropriate.”). 
 231 Suter, 503 US at 364. See also notes 118–36.  
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federal government and the states, and the text of the statute con-
veys the conditions states must satisfy to receive federal fund-
ing.232 However, this does not necessarily mean that every section 
and provision of such legislation is specifically about federal fund-
ing of state programs and thus unenforceable. The Supreme 
Court has never taken this position, and Congress’s Suter fix im-
plies that Spending Clause legislation can still give rise to en-
forceable rights under § 1983. 
However, the clear statement in § 671(a) tying the conditions 
to federal funding is vital because it gives notice to states of what 
they must do in order to receive federal funding.233 Recall 
Pennhurst’s instruction that the “legitimacy” of Spending Clause 
legislation “rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly 
accepts the terms of the ‘contract.’”234 Section 671(a) establishes 
the legitimacy of the CWA by making clear to states what they 
are agreeing to in return for federal funds. Section 671(a) estab-
lishes the overall framework of the CWA, and without it, none of 
the CWA’s provisions could possibly be enforceable. For there can 
“be no knowing acceptance if a State is unaware of the conditions 
or is unable to ascertain what is expected of it.”235 Such a founda-
tion is indeed necessary for the creation of an enforceable right. 
However, it is not sufficient because, when viewed in isolation, 
§ 671(a) does not explicitly identify the individuals these policies 
are designed to serve. Something more—a provision with an indi-
vidualized focus on the CWA’s intended beneficiaries—is needed 
to confer upon foster caregivers an enforceable right to foster care 
maintenance payments. 
b) Section 671 versus § 672.  The CWA’s structure separates 
out the relationship between the federal government and states 
from the relationship between states and foster caregivers. 
Congress carved out § 672 of the CWA as a separate section from 
§ 671 to address foster care maintenance payments more fully. 
Section 672 provides that “[e]ach State with a plan approved 
under this part shall make foster care maintenance payments on 
behalf of each child”236 to the child’s foster caregiver, whether that 
 
 232 See Pennhurst, 451 US at 17. 
 233 42 USC § 671(a) (“In order for a State to be eligible for payments. . . .”). 
 234 See Pennhurst, 451 US at 17. 
 235 Id. 
 236 42 USC § 672(a)(1). 
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is a “foster family”237 or a “child-care institution.”238 Notably, 
§ 672(a) addresses only states and the foster caregivers of foster 
children on whose behalf foster care maintenance payments must 
be provided to cover certain costs. Whereas § 671 contains an 
aggregate focus on the contractual relationship between the 
federal government and states, § 672 contains a distinctly 
individualized focus on the quasicontractual relationship 
between states and foster caregivers. Section 672 provides an 
important additional layer to the CWA’s framework in which the 
right to foster care maintenance payments is divorced from the 
aggregate focus that permeates § 671(a). 
In contrast, the structure of the FERPA provision in Gonzaga 
collapsed the relationships between the federal government, state 
institutions, and students and their parents. The respondent, a 
former student at Gonzaga University, claimed that students 
were the intended beneficiaries of FERPA and that the statute 
created an enforceable right to student privacy.239 The statute pro-
vided that “[n]o funds shall be made available . . . to any educa-
tional agency or institution which has a policy or practice of per-
mitting the release of education records . . . of students without 
the written consent of their parents.”240 The provision addressed 
both the relationship between the state actors and the federal 
government and the relationship between state actors and stu-
dents and their parents—all in one sentence. Thus, the provision 
conveyed both an aggregate focus on state compliance and federal 
funding and an individual focus on student privacy. Ultimately, 
the Court found that the FERPA provision’s overall emphasis on 
state policies precluded the inference that Congress intended for 
the provision to be privately enforceable under § 1983.241 By 
blending together the relationships between the federal govern-
ment, state actors, and individuals, the integrated structure of 
the FERPA provision is markedly different from the divided 
structure of the CWA, which addresses these relationships sepa-
rately in § 671(a) and § 672(a). 
 
 237 42 USC § 672(b)(1). 
 238 42 USC § 672(b)(2). See 42 USC § 672(c) for the CWA’s definitions of “foster family 
home” and “child-care institution.” 
 239 Gonzaga, 536 US at 277. 
 240 20 USC § 1232g(b)(1). 
 241 Gonzaga, 536 US at 290. 
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c) The design of § 672 speaks directly to the rights of foster 
caregivers.  The title of § 672(a)(1), “Eligibility,” refers to individ-
ual foster children eligible to have foster care maintenance pay-
ments provided on their behalf to their caregivers. Only the 
Eighth Circuit noted the section’s title, and the court interprets 
the section as “set[ting] forth limitations on when a foster care 
maintenance payment is eligible for partial federal reimburse-
ment.”242 However, the Eighth Circuit ignored the CWA’s divided 
structure by conflating the use and application of “[e]ligibility” in 
§ 672(a)(1) with that of “eligible” in § 671(a). Whereas § 671(a) 
addresses the conditions and limitations placed upon states to be 
“eligible” for federal reimbursements,243 § 672(a)(1) speaks di-
rectly to the individual foster children who are eligible to have 
foster care maintenance payments made on their behalf. 
In § 672(a)(1), eligibility is linked to whether a foster child 
would have been eligible for assistance under the AFDC-FC pro-
gram, which preceded the passage of the CWA.244 Under the 
AFDC-FC program,245 there were four requirements for a child to 
be eligible to have financial assistance provided to his or her care-
giver: (1) the child must have been removed from his or her home 
only after a determination by the state that remaining in the 
home was “contrary to the welfare” of the child; (2) in the month 
prior to removal, the child must have been eligible for assistance 
under the AFDC program, and the child’s parent(s) or guardian(s) 
must have been receiving payments at the time of removal; (3) the 
child must have been removed by the state agency tasked with 
providing AFDC assistance; and (4) the child must be placed in a 
foster home that has been approved by the state.246 
Congress literally wrote the continuity between the AFDC-
FC program and the CWA into § 672, which accounts for all four 
of these eligibility requirements. First, a child’s foster caregiver 
 
 242 Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1199. 
 243 42 USC § 671(a). 
 244 See 2011 Green Book at *2 (cited in note 60). 
 245 See notes 32–35 and accompanying text for a brief discussion of the historical ori-
gins of AFDC-FC programs in the early 1960s. 
 246 2011 Green Book at *2–3 (cited in note 60). Under the AFDC program, states were 
required “to provide cash assistance to all eligible families. Working within federal limi-
tations, the states administered the program, established the income level below which 
families qualified for assistance in that state, and set the level of benefits that eligible 
families would receive there.” Stephen B. Page and Mary B. Larner, Introduction to the 
AFDC Program, 7 The Future of Children 20, 21 (1997). See also notes 28–34 and accom-
panying text for a brief discussion of the growth of the AFDC and AFDC-FC programs 
during the 1960–1970s. 
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is eligible for foster care maintenance payments only if the foster 
child’s parents voluntarily agreed to removal or if there has been 
a judicial determination that continuing in the home “would be 
contrary to the welfare of the child.”247 Second, a foster child’s 
caregiver is eligible for foster care maintenance payments if “the 
child, while in the home, would have met the AFDC eligibility re-
quirement.”248 Third, the state agency that submits state plans for 
federal assistance must also be the agency responsible for the 
child’s placement.249 Fourth, a child must be placed in a “foster 
family home or child-care institution”250 as defined by the stat-
ute,251 and only foster families and childcare institutions are enti-
tled to receive foster care maintenance payments from the 
state.252 Thus, the CWA incorporated and preserved the AFDC-
FC program’s four eligibility requirements for foster children 
whose caregivers are entitled to receive payments. 
Other structural features of § 672 also indicate that the title 
of § 672(a)(1) refers to children whose foster caregivers are enti-
tled to receive foster care maintenance payments. For example, 
§ 672(a)(4) is titled “Eligibility of certain alien children,”253 and 
§ 672(i) is titled “Administrative costs associated with otherwise 
eligible children not in licensed foster care settings.”254 Each of 
these titles reinforces the conclusion that § 672(a)(1) is “phrased 
in terms benefiting” foster children and their caregivers,255 with 
the CWA identifying foster parents and foster care institutions as 
the direct recipients of payments. The right to foster care mainte-
nance payments is inextricably linked to the eligibility of foster 
children. 
The Brook Amendment provision, which the Wright Court 
held conferred an enforceable right under § 1983, had a similar 
 
 247 42 USC § 672(a)(2)(A)(i)–(ii). 
 248 42 USC § 672(a)(1)(B). See also notes 59–61 for a discussion of the eligibility re-
quirements for foster care maintenance payments under the CWA. 
 249 42 USC § 672(a)(2)(B)(i). Alternatively, the state agency that submits state plans 
under § 671 may enter into agreement with another state agency or an “Indian tribe or a 
tribal organization” for the purposes of managing foster child placement. See 42 USC 
§ 672(a)(2)(B)(ii)–(iii). 
 250 42 USC § 672(a)(2)(C). 
 251 See 42 USC § 672(c) (defining “foster family home” and “child-care institution”). 
 252 See 42 USC § 672(b) (identifying the recipients of foster care maintenance pay-
ments on behalf of children who are eligible under § 672(a)). 
 253 42 USC § 672(a)(4). 
 254 42 USC § 672(i). 
 255 See Wilder, 496 US at 510. 
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structure that identified the eligible beneficiaries under the stat-
ute. The original title of that provision was “Families included; 
amount,”256 and at the time Wright was decided, the statute in-
cluded eligibility requirements for a family to qualify for public 
housing at rents with hard-capped rates.257 The Court held that 
the statute conferred an enforceable right because the provision 
unambiguously identified which families were eligible for public 
housing at reduced rates.258 The Court found that it “could not be 
clearer” who was entitled to public housing and how the rates 
should be calculated and that Congress’s “intent to benefit ten-
ants was undeniable.”259 
The most noticeable difference between the structure of the 
CWA and that of the statutory provisions at issue in Wright and 
Wilder is that the CWA’s definition for foster care maintenance 
payments—a term that is vague on its own—is found not in 
§ 672(a) but rather in § 675(4)(A).260 The Eighth Circuit took issue 
with the fact that this statutory provision is found in a defini-
tional section, and citing an Eleventh Circuit case, it maintained 
that “an enforceable right [located] solely within a purely defini-
tional section is antithetical to requiring unambiguous congres-
sional intent.”261 This contention is misplaced for two reasons. 
First, the Eleventh Circuit case, 31 Foster Children v Bush,262 
cited Gonzaga and two district court cases to support the asserted 
rule that statutory provisions that are definitional in nature can-
not on their own create enforceable rights under § 1983.263 But 
Gonzaga asserted no such rule, and the Eleventh Circuit cited a 
 
 256 42 USC § 1437a(a) (1988). 
 257 42 USC § 1437a(a) (1988).  
 258 Wright, 479 US at 430.  
 259 Id. 
 260 Section 675 is titled “Definitions,” and it defines “foster care maintenance pay-
ments” as payments covering “food, clothing, shelter, daily supervision, school supplies, a 
child’s personal incidentals, liability insurance with respect to a child, reasonable travel 
to the child’s home for visitation, and reasonable travel for the child to remain in the school 
in which the child is enrolled at the time of placement.” 42 USC § 675(4)(A). 
 261 Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1197, citing 31 Foster Children v Bush, 329 F3d 
1255, 1271 (11th Cir 2003).  
 262 329 F3d 1255 (11th Cir 2003). 
 263 See 31 Foster Children, 329 F3d at 1271, citing Gonzaga, 536 US at 280 (finding 
that, because the statutory provisions at issue “are definitional in nature, they alone can-
not and do not supply a basis for conferring rights enforceable under § 1983”). See also 
Charlie H. v Whitman, 83 F Supp 2d 476, 490 (D NJ 2000) (finding that § 675(5), standing 
alone, does not confer a right enforceable under § 1983); B.H. v Johnson, 715 F Supp 1387, 
1401 (ND Ill 1989) (“It would be strange for Congress to create enforceable rights in the 
definitional section of a statute.”). 
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page of the Gonzaga opinion that contains no language about the 
ability to enforce a statutory right that is located solely in a defi-
nitional section of a statute.264 Moreover, the word “definition” is 
not found anywhere in the Gonzaga opinion.265 Thus, there is no 
Supreme Court precedent for the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits’ 
asserted rule that is binding on the present analysis. 
But suppose, for a moment, that the asserted rule were bind-
ing on the present analysis. The rule still would not foreclose en-
forcement of the right to foster care maintenance payments be-
cause the statutory right is not located solely within the 
definitional section of the CWA. Rather, the statutory right arises 
from the language of § 672(a)(1) in conjunction with the definition 
provided by § 675(4)(A). Whereas § 672(a) places a binding obli-
gation on states to make foster care maintenance payments and 
identifies the individuals entitled to such payments, § 675(4)(A) 
provides the content of right by defining what the payments must 
cover. Far from being solely located in § 675(4)(A), the statutory 
language addressing the right to foster care maintenance pay-
ments is instead primarily located in § 672(a), which is not a def-
initional section. However, § 675(4)(A) provides helpful clarity as 
to what the right to foster care maintenance payments entails. 
And without the specific definition in § 675(4)(A), the right to fos-
ter care maintenance payments would possibly be too vague and 
amorphous for enforcement under § 1983.266 
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit suggested that a right 
that is located in a definitional section may be enforceable if the 
right is also referenced elsewhere in the statute. In 31 Foster  
Children, the plaintiffs asserted a right to particular procedures 
under a case review system that is compliant with the CWA.267 At 
the time the case was decided, § 671(a)(16) required state plans 
to incorporate a case review system that “meets the requirements 
described in” § 675(5)(B).268 The plaintiffs argued that states must 
also comply with § 675(5)(D)–(E), the definitional provisions that 
included the specific language regarding the right asserted by the 
 
 264 The Eleventh Circuit opinion cited to page 280 of Gonzaga for support of the rule 
that a definitional statute “alone cannot and do[es] not supply a basis for conferring rights 
enforceable under § 1983.” 31 Foster Children, 329 F3d at 1271.  
 265 See generally Gonzaga, 536 US 273. 
 266 Recall that the second factor of the Blessing test is whether “the right assertedly 
protected by the statute is not so ‘vague and amorphous’ that its enforcement would strain 
judicial competence.” Blessing, 520 US at 340–41. See text accompanying notes 181–82. 
 267 See 31 Foster Children, 329 F3d at 1271. 
 268 See id. 
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plaintiffs.269 But the Eleventh Circuit found that § 671(a)(16) 
plainly required compliance only with § 675(5)(B) and not with 
§ 675(5)(D)–(E).270 Nevertheless, the court implied that the plain-
tiffs may have had a stronger case if § 671(a)(16) conditioned fed-
eral funding on a state’s compliance with all of § 675(5).271 In con-
trast, § 671(a)(1) requires state plans to provide for foster care 
maintenance payments as a condition for receiving federal fund-
ing, and states must do so “in accordance with” § 672 in its en-
tirety. Section 672 is not a definitional section, and it incorporates 
the definition of foster care maintenance payments provided by 
§ 675(4)(A).272 
2. The text of § 672 employs rights-creating language. 
Section 672 contains rights-creating language because it is 
“phrased in terms of the persons benefited” rather than the entity 
regulated.273 The rights-creating language within § 672 comprises 
three elements: (1) the statutory right being created (“foster care 
maintenance payments on behalf of each child” who qualifies274); 
(2) the source providing and protecting the right (“[e]ach State 
with a plan approved under this part”275); and (3) the individuals 
entitled to the right (each “foster family”276 and “child-care insti-
tution”277 caring for an eligible child). Viewed as a whole, these 
three elements clarify what right is being created, who is respon-
sible for providing and protecting the right, and who is entitled to 
the right. 
In comparing § 672 to provisions at issue in other Supreme 
Court cases, the circuit courts did not break down the provisions 
into these three constituent parts. However, the provision of the 
 
 269 See id. 
 270 See id (“[The plaintiffs] argue that we should not interpret § 671(a)(16) to require 
compliance only with § 675(5)(B) in order for states to receive federal funds, but we think 
that is the most logical interpretation.”). 
 271 See 31 Foster Children, 329 F3d at 1271 (finding that, because § 671(a)(16) “does 
not go beyond” requiring compliance with § 675(5)(B) and “explicitly require[s] a plan to 
meet the requirements described in §§ 675(5)(D) and (E),” the latter provisions are not 
required conditions for federal funding and thus not enforceable on their own).  
 272 See 42 USC § 672(b)(2) (noting that the term “foster care maintenance payments” 
is defined in § 675(4)(A)). 
 273 See Gonzaga, 536 US at 284, quoting Cannon v University of Chicago, 441 US 677, 
692 n 13 (1979). 
 274 42 USC § 672(a)(1). 
 275 42 USC § 672(a)(1). 
 276 42 USC § 672(b)(1). 
 277 42 USC § 672(b)(2). 
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Boren Amendment to the Medicaid Act, which the Wilder Court 
found enforceable under § 1983, consisted of the same three ele-
ments. First, the asserted right was “rates” that would yield “rea-
sonable and adequate” reimbursements for medical services.278 
Second, the entity tasked with providing the right was any state 
that submitted “a State plan for medical assistance.”279 To receive 
approval, state plans were required to include rates for calculat-
ing reimbursements, “which the State finds, and makes assur-
ances satisfactory to the Secretary, are reasonable and ade-
quate.”280 Third, the beneficiaries of the right were medical 
providers offering “inpatient hospital services” to “individuals 
[who are] eligible” for Medicaid.281 The states, not the federal gov-
ernment, were responsible for protecting medical providers’ right 
to reimbursements at reasonable rates, and medical providers 
could sue under § 1983 to enforce that right. 
Breaking down the statutory provision’s language is helpful 
to distinguish between statutes in which Congress intended to 
create an enforceable right and statutes that merely have the ef-
fect of benefitting certain groups.282 First, plaintiffs seeking to en-
force a right under § 1983 must cite specific statutory text enti-
tling them to a right rather than a statute conferring some 
generalized benefit or set of undefined rights.283 For example, in 
Blessing, the Court found that it is “incumbent” upon plaintiffs 
“to identify with particularity the rights they [have] claimed.”284 
There, the plaintiffs sued their state for failing to comply with 
Title IV-D of the SSA, which governs state payments to qualifying 
families under the AFDC program. However, the plaintiffs did not 
identify any specific provisions within Title IV-D entitling them 
to particular rights, and thus the Court refused to allow the plain-
tiffs to force their state to provide any of the benefits contained 
within the law.285 
 
 278 See 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988). 
 279 See 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988). 
 280 See 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988). 
 281 See 42 USC § 1396a(a)(13)(A) (1988). 
 282 See Blessing, 520 US at 342 (“Only when [a] complaint is broken down into man-
ageable analytic bites can a court ascertain whether each separate claim satisfies the var-
ious criteria we have set forth for determining whether a federal statute creates rights.”). 
 283 See id (noting that “it is impossible [for courts] to determine whether [an entire 
statute], as an undifferentiated whole, gives rise to undefined ‘rights’”). 
 284 See id. 
 285 See id. 
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After identifying the statutory provision containing the as-
serted right, plaintiffs must show that the language of the statute 
directly addresses the individuals entitled to the right. The stat-
utory provision must require that states take certain actions to 
provide or protect the right in all circumstances. Thus, an as-
serted right must be more than a system-wide policy that pro-
duces certain benefits.286 In Gonzaga, the Court found that stu-
dents could not enforce a right to privacy under the provision in 
question because the provision did not prohibit individual disclo-
sure of student records. Instead, the provision prohibited states 
from having a “policy or practice” of disclosing educational records 
of students without consent or else risk losing funding.287 If the 
statute had explicitly said that state educational institutions 
would lose funding if they disclosed an individual student’s rec-
ords, then the plaintiff would have likely had a stronger claim for 
being able to sue under § 1983. However, the plaintiff in Gonzaga 
failed to show that the FERPA provision entitled each individual 
student to a right to privacy in all instances. 
The Eighth Circuit compared the language of § 672(a) to that 
of the FERPA provision in Gonzaga, and the court “[a]dmittedly” 
stated that § 672(a) “do[es] not explicitly proclaim ‘no funds shall 
be made available to match a state’s foster care maintenance pay-
ments if the state has certain reimbursement policies or prac-
tices,’ as the exact analogue of the statute at issue in Gonzaga 
would.”288 The Eighth Circuit nevertheless viewed the differences 
between the actual text of the CWA and its hypothetical “ana-
logue” to be immaterial; however, in doing so, it glossed over at 
least three reasons for why the CWA’s language tips the scale in 
favor of a focus on individual rights, not on state compliance. 
First, the Eighth Circuit’s analogue distorted the focus of the 
actual text of § 672(a) because it omits the intended beneficiaries 
of the provision: foster caregivers whose foster children meet the 
eligibility criteria. By not explicitly identifying the intended 
beneficiaries of the provision and the interests of children, the 
Eighth Circuit’s analogue stripped a key element from the CWA’s 
rights-creating language, and thus the focus was “two steps 
 
 286 See Gonzaga, 536 US at 300 (Stevens dissenting) (noting that the Court has held 
that “generalized,” “systemwide” duties on States do not create enforceable rights under 
§ 1983). 
 287 See 20 USC § 1232g(b)(1). 
 288 See Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1202, citing Gonzaga, 536 US at 279. 
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removed from the interests of individual”289 foster children and 
foster caregivers. 
Second, by invoking federal funding, the Eighth Circuit’s 
analogue replaced § 672’s individualized focus on the relationship 
between states and foster caregivers with an aggregate focus on 
the relationship between the federal government and state 
compliance. 
Third, unlike the actual text of § 672, the Eighth Circuit’s 
analogue did not require states to make foster care maintenance 
payments to each child’s foster caregiver. Instead, it requires 
states to refrain only from certain, undefined “reimbursement 
policies.” A state could have a policy of making foster care mainte-
nance payments on behalf of each child yet fail to comply by its 
own policy in all instances and still maintain “substantial con-
formity” with the CWA. The Eighth Circuit’s analogue would not 
prohibit federal funding as long as a state does not adopt a re-
stricted policy. However, the plain text of § 672 does not require 
states to choose or refrain from certain policies. It affords no such 
discretion, for it requires full compliance with respect to each in-
dividual child. Therefore, the focus of the text is on state action 
vis-à-vis each child—not on a state’s general policies regarding 
foster caregivers and children in the aggregate. 
B. Contextualizing the CWA 
The legislative history and purpose of the CWA provide evi-
dence that Congress intended for foster caregivers to be able to 
enforce their right to foster care maintenance payments.  
Section 1983 enforcement is crucial for ensuring that states up-
hold their obligations to foster caregivers and foster children un-
der the CWA. If § 1983 enforcement of the right to foster care 
maintenance payments were to become entirely unavailable, fos-
ter caregivers would have very few other options for remedying a 
state’s noncompliance. Because showing that Congress intended 
a statute to confer an enforceable right is also a requisite element 
of establishing that a statute contains an implied right of action, 
the foreclosure of § 1983 enforcement would likely also preclude 
enforcement through an implied right of action.290 
 
 289 Gonzaga, 536 US at 287. 
 290 See notes 146–47 and accompanying text. See also Ashish Prasad, Comment, 
Rights without Remedies: Section 1983 Enforcement of Title IV-D of the Social Security 
Act, 60 U Chi L Rev 197, 198 (1993) (arguing that “the Supreme Court has adopted a 
strong presumption against implied rights of action”). 
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Section 1983 enforcement is the most appropriate mechanism 
for protecting the rights of foster caregivers in a way that best 
promotes the interests of foster children. When private enforce-
ment is unavailable, Pennhurst and Gonzaga instruct that “the 
typical remedy for state noncompliance” with Spending Clause 
legislation is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but 
rather terminating a state’s federal funding.291 Accordingly, be-
cause the Eighth Circuit found that § 1983 actions were not avail-
able to foster caregivers, the court advised the plaintiffs that their 
federal remedy was to ask the federal government to stop provid-
ing reimbursements to their state for foster care maintenance 
payments.292 However, for a foster caregiver to ask the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services to terminate funding to her state 
for failing to comply with the CWA would not protect her right to 
foster care maintenance payments or serve the interests of the 
foster child in her care. In fact, such a “remedy” would only make 
matters worse for foster children living in her state. 
This Section argues that the legislative history and purpose 
of the CWA provide further evidence that Congress intended for 
foster caregivers to have an enforceable right to foster care 
maintenance payments under § 1983. Part III.B.1 examines how 
§ 1983 actions to enforce the right to foster care maintenance pay-
ments appropriately further the legislative purpose of the CWA. 
Part III.B.2 responds to courts and legal scholars who oppose ex-
panding the scope of § 1983 actions by showing that § 1983 en-
forcement of foster care maintenance payments does not pose the 
federalism and separation of powers concerns these critics raise. 
Finally, Part III.B.3 posits that the context of the CWA’s enact-
ment and subsequent legislative history support the conclusion 
that Congress intended the right to foster care maintenance pay-
ments to be enforceable under § 1983. 
1. Foster care maintenance payments and the CWA’s 
purpose. 
The CWA provides no remedy for foster caregivers to enforce 
the right to foster care maintenance payments, and arguing that 
Congress intended to create a remedy through an implied right of 
 
 291 Pennhurst, 451 US at 28; Gonzaga, 536 US at 280. 
 292 See Midwest Foster Care, 712 F3d at 1202–03 (instructing the “[foster] [p]roviders 
[that their] federal remedy [was] to seek termination of matching funds as a consequence 
for [their] state’s shortcomings”). 
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action is incredibly difficult.293 Unlike plaintiffs suing under an 
implied cause of action, plaintiffs “suing under § 1983 do not have 
the burden of showing an intent to create a private remedy be-
cause § 1983 generally supplies a remedy for the vindication of 
rights secured by federal statutes.”294 Given that there is no fed-
eral review mechanism within the CWA through which foster 
caregivers can submit claims, suing under § 1983 is the most via-
ble and efficient option for foster caregivers to force their state to 
make adequate foster care maintenance payments in accordance 
with the CWA. 
Because foster care maintenance payments occur after a child 
has been removed from his or her home, they do not directly bear 
on the CWA’s purpose of preserving families and preventing un-
necessary removals. However, they do indirectly further the CWA’s 
purpose of reunifying families by covering the costs of “reasonable 
travel to the child’s home for visitation.”295 Section 675a(b) includes 
a “List of rights” for foster children, and one of these rights is “vis-
itation” with a child’s parent(s) or guardian(s).296 Ensuring children 
receive their right to routine visitations with their families is crit-
ical for preserving familial bonds between foster children and their 
parents, and adequate foster care maintenance payments further 
this goal by covering the costs of travel and time expended. More-
over, by enabling periodic visitations between a foster child and her 
parents, foster care maintenance payments may increase the like-
lihood that reunification will occur more quickly, thereby avoiding 
the harms caused by foster care drift297 and “perpetual states of fa-
milial uncertainty.”298 
The phenomenon of foster care drift—in which foster children 
are shuffled between multiple foster homes for indefinite periods 
of time—was one of the pivotal forces that motivated Congress to 
enact the CWA.299 Child welfare advocates and many members of 
Congress were worried in the late 1970s that too many children 
 
 293 See Alexander v Sandoval, 532 US 275, 286 (2001) (“The judicial task is to inter-
pret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it displays an intent to create 
not just a private right but also a private remedy. . . . Statutory intent on this latter point 
is determinative.”) (emphasis added). 
 294 Gonzaga, 536 US at 284. 
 295 42 USC § 675(4)(A). 
 296 42 USC § 675a(4)(1). 
 297 See Bailie, 66 Fordham L Rev at 2289 (cited in note 39). See also Smith v  
Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 US 816, 838 n 41 (1977) 
(describing harms in the foster care system). 
 298 See Sanders, 29 J of Legis at 61 (cited in note 36). 
 299 See text accompanying notes 42–54. 
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were being moved into foster care and being floated between mul-
tiple homes. Despite the noble ambitions of the CWA in tackling 
foster care drift, this problem continues to plague the foster care 
system today, and lack of funding is a persistent obstacle to real-
izing the full potential of the CWA.300 The effects of this problem 
are often dire and irreversible. According to a report by the  
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), foster care has profound 
effects on a child’s cognitive and social development,301 and sub-
jecting a foster child to multiple placements can be especially “in-
jurious” to a child’s psychological development.302 Thus, the AAP 
emphasizes that foster children “need continuity, consistency, 
and predictability from their caregiver.”303 
Professors Brian Duncan and Laura Arys advise policymak-
ers that foster care drift and multiple placements can be reduced 
in part by ensuring that foster caregivers are equipped with the 
proper resources to meet the needs of the foster children en-
trusted to their care.304 In a 2007 empirical study, Duncan and 
Arys investigated “whether more generous foster care payments 
lead to more stable placements.”305 The study found that “the fi-
nancial compensation paid by states can have a significant impact 
on the experiences of children in foster homes” by promoting sta-
bility and ensuring that a foster child has adequate resources.306 
According to the study, a $100 increase in foster care mainte-
nance payments would “decrease the number of times the average 
child is moved from one foster placement to another by 20%.”307 
Finally, the study also concluded that the size of foster care 
 
 300 See Elisa Kawam, Revisiting the Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 
1980: Analysis, Critique, and Recommendations, 1 World J Soc Science Rsrch 23, 35 (2014) 
(suggesting that, in the years following the passage of the CWA, “the argument over fund-
ing and implementation took center stage [in Congress and in public policy debates] in-
stead of prioritizing the needs of the families and children who are served by the child 
welfare system”). 
 301 According to the AAP, foster care “experiences are critical in the short- and long-
term development of a child’s brain and the ability to subsequently participate fully in 
society.” In addition, foster children “have disproportionately high rates of physical, 
developmental, and mental health problems.” See American Academy of Pediatrics, 
Committee on Early Childhood, Adoption and Dependent Care, Developmental Issues for 
Young Children in Foster Care, 106 Pediatrics 1145, 1145 (2000). 
 302 See id at 1149. 
 303 See id. 
 304 Brian Duncan and Laura Argys, Economic Incentives and Foster Care Placement, 
74 S Econ J 114, 135, 139–40 (2007). 
 305 Id at 135. 
 306 Id at 140. 
 307 Id at 11. 
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maintenance payments has a “statistically significant effect on a 
family’s willingness to take in a foster child.”308 Thus, forcing 
states to make adequate foster care maintenance payments di-
rectly confronts the problem of foster care drift. Active private en-
forcement deters underpayment of foster care maintenance pay-
ments, enabling more individuals to become and remain foster 
caregivers throughout the entire duration of their foster child’s 
placement. By reducing the likelihood of multiple placements, ad-
equate foster care maintenance payments also minimize the po-
tentially detrimental effects that removal and prolonged place-
ment in foster care can have on a child’s psychological 
development and well-being. 
2. Criticisms of expansive § 1983 enforcement. 
By expanding the scope of § 1983 to include enforcement of 
statutory rights, Thiboutot represented a major turning point for 
§ 1983 litigation.309 The Court’s holding faced forceful criticism al-
most immediately.310 Indeed, in his dissent, Justice Lewis Powell 
warned that the Court’s decision “create[d] a major new intrusion 
into state sovereignty under our federal system.”311 However, 
§ 1983 actions to enforce federal statutes were far from uncom-
mon when Thiboutot was decided, and some commentators have 
argued that the “conclusion in Thiboutot conformed to the major-
ity position in the lower federal courts.”312 
Criticism of expansive § 1983 enforcement of statutory rights 
has taken a variety of forms, including pragmatic concerns and 
critiques based on federalism and separation of powers.313 Critics 
 
 308 Duncan and Argys, 74 S Econ J at 139 (cited in note 304). 
 309 See Daniel P. Tokaji, Public Rights and Private Rights of Action: The Enforcement 
of Federal Election Laws, 44 Ind L Rev 113, 133 (2010) (describing Thiboutot as the “sem-
inal case for private plaintiffs suing under § 1983 for statutory violations”). See also notes 
82–87 and accompanying text. 
 310 See, for example, John R. Bartels, Recent Expansion in Federal Jurisdiction: A 
Call for Restraint, 55 St John’s L Rev 219, 229 (1981) (“Thiboutot’s expansive interpreta-
tion of section 1983 poses a threat to the balance of federal/state relations.”). 
 311 Thiboutot, 448 US at 33 (Powell dissenting). 
 312 Sunstein, 49 U Chi L Rev at 397 n 17 (cited in note 21). 
 313 See, for example, Linnet Davis-Stermitz, Comment, Stigma plus Whom? Evaluat-
ing Causation in Multiple-Actor Stigma-Plus Claims, 84 U Chi L Rev 1883, 1894–95 (2017) 
(arguing that “[t]he modern § 1983 has been a lightning rod for criticism,” with objections 
pointing to an “outsized impact on federal dockets,” a reduction of “collegiality and pre-
dictability,” and a host of federalism concerns). 
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have pointed to the “litigation explosion”314 following Thiboutot 
and the resulting “burdens on federal courts”315 and “financial 
burden[s] on [ ] states” defending against § 1983 actions.316 More-
over, critics have highlighted a host of “federalism concerns that 
arise when plaintiffs . . . procure a federal injunction that will 
compel changes in the operation of a state institution.”317 Under-
scoring much of the criticism is a discomfort that § 1983 actions 
may “interfere[ ] with the states’ ability to manage their own gov-
ernmental activities” and transfer greater power to federal courts 
to shape federal laws and policies.318 Justice Harry Blackmun, 
however, argued that the “so-called federalism ‘problem’ . . . is 
largely an illusory one.”319 This is because § 1983 is “only a vehicle 
for substantive claims that have their base elsewhere. It is not an 
independent source of constitutional or statutory rights.”320 
But in the context of Spending Clause legislation, the federal 
government also has the option to cut off the statute’s entire fund-
ing stream for a state’s noncompliance. Imagine if the plaintiffs 
who lost in Midwest Foster Care followed the Eighth Circuit’s ad-
vice and asked the Secretary of Health and Human Services to 
stop providing federal funding under the CWA to their state. If 
successful, the effects of such a remedy would be widely felt by 
foster caregivers and foster children throughout the entire state. 
In addition, the capacity of state agencies to provide foster care 
and adoptive services would be severely crippled. Compared to 
such a drastic measure, § 1983 actions are far less intrusive on a 
state’s autonomy. A plaintiff who successfully sues under § 1983 
to force her state to pay adequate foster care maintenance pay-
ments would simply force the state to pay damages. The § 1983 
remedy protects the rights of the foster caregiver without desta-
bilizing state agencies or interfering with the rights and interests 
 
 314 See Eric Harbrook Cottrell, Note, Civil Rights Plaintiffs, Clogged Courts, and the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: The Supreme Court Takes a Look at Heightened Pleading 
Standards in Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 
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 315 See Taylor Van Hove, Comment, Fraud, Mistake, and Section 1983 Prison Claims: 
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of other foster caregivers and foster children in a state.321 Thus, it 
makes little sense to deny families a § 1983 remedy based on an 
assumption that private enforcement might somehow burden 
state autonomy more than a full-scale funding prohibition would. 
Federalism concerns are less pronounced when a plaintiff 
sues for damages than when a plaintiff sues for equitable relief.322 
In the former instance, “section 1983 damage suits require no 
conclusion that the state process is improper.”323 The Court’s 
§ 1983 jurisprudence suggests a greater willingness to uphold the 
enforceability of monetary entitlements when a federal law is 
specific and lacks any review mechanism.324 In contrast, suits in 
equity “involve a specific request to enjoin a state act.”325 When a 
statutory provision is vague, a plaintiff’s request for an injunction 
may result in federal judges supplanting the authority of state 
agencies tasked with implementation of a federal law with their 
own personal judgments about how the law should be 
implemented. 
 
 321 The likelihood that litigation would deter unlawful conduct by states was also a 
“key factor” for courts determining if Congress intended a statute to contain an implied 
right of action. See Frankel, 67 Va L Rev at 556 (cited in note 71) (analyzing the deterrent 
effect of implied causes of action on states under the securities laws). But see Bivens v Six 
Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 US 388, 407–08 (1971) 
(Harlan concurring) (citations omitted): 
[T]he appropriateness of according [the plaintiff] compensatory relief does not 
turn simply on the deterrent effect liability will have on federal official conduct. 
Damages as a traditional form of compensation for invasion of a legally protected 
interest may be entirely appropriate even if no substantial deterrent effects on 
future official lawlessness might be thought to result. [The plaintiff], after all, 
has invoked judicial processes claiming entitlement to compensation for injuries 
resulting from allegedly lawless official behavior, if those injuries are properly 
compensable in money damages. 
 322 See Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 7 n 20 (cited in note 317) (“The federalism prob-
lems created by civil rights litigation are raised most dramatically by suits in equity, which 
seek direct interference by federal judges in state activities.”). While plaintiffs may bring 
§ 1983 actions to seek damages or equitable relief for violations of Spending Clause legis-
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§ 1983 actions seeking damages. In Pennhurst, Suter, and Blessing, the plaintiffs sued for 
equitable relief, while in Wright, Wilder, and Gonzaga, the plaintiffs sued for damages. 
The Court allowed only the plaintiffs in Wright and Wilder to proceed. 
 323 Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 30 (cited in note 317). 
 324 See text accompanying notes 208–10. 
 325 Whitman, 79 Mich L Rev at 30 (cited in note 317). See also Note, Developments in 
the Law, 90 Harv L Rev at 1185 (cited in note 78) (“Th[e] traditional model of federal-state 
relations in the context of federal court adjudication . . . begins to break down when one 
considers those actions which are most often thought to threaten the functioning of the 
state—the modern injunctive suit.”). 
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Section 1983 enforcement of the CWA’s foster care mainte-
nance payment provisions does not curtail the flexibility of each 
state to administer foster care services in the way it views most 
proper.326 Foster caregivers suing for inadequate foster care 
maintenance payments are not asking federal courts to usurp the 
authority of state agencies to design their own foster care 
plans327—they are simply asking that foster care maintenance 
payments cover the costs they are supposed to cover. Although 
litigation is limited only to the parties in a given case,328 § 1983 
actions to enforce foster care maintenance payments may lead 
states “to take steps to reduce injuries whenever the steps appear 
less costly than the injuries they prevent.”329 Thus, the prospect 
of costly litigation would likely motivate states to ensure that the 
foster care maintenance payments they provide to foster caregiv-
ers are adequate and in accordance with the law. While compli-
ance may require states to expend greater resources to increase 
the size of foster care maintenance payments, these financial bur-
dens are largely overstated because the federal government reim-
burses states for the majority of its expenditures on foster care 
maintenance payments.330 
As for separation of powers concerns, § 1983 enforcement of 
the foster care maintenance payments provision does not supplant 
the authority of the Department of Health and Human  
Services because there is no federal mechanism through which the 
agency can review individual claims. Moreover, the Department of 
Health and Human Services still retains the authority to revoke 
funding due to a state’s noncompliance.331 In addition, § 1983 does 
 
 326 See Note, Developments in the Law, 90 Harv L Rev at 1190 (cited in note 78) (ar-
guing that, “at least in the damage action context, the federal intrusion into state affairs 
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not greatly interfere with the domain of state agencies because su-
ing for damages under § 1983 requires a court only to determine 
whether the plaintiff’s asserted right has been violated and to 
award damages when necessary. Monetary damages do not require 
state agencies to forfeit autonomy in how they design and admin-
ister child welfare services; however, equitable relief, such as an 
injunction, likely would. As mentioned above, § 1983 actions solve 
underenforcement problems that stem from the lack of a robust re-
view mechanism, and the deterrent effect of potentially costly liti-
gation encourages state agencies to design and implement foster 
care systems that are more faithful to the requirements imposed 
by the CWA.332 In sum, § 1983 enforcement merely ensures that 
the CWA does what Congress designed it to do. 
3. The CWA’s enactment in the context of § 1983 cases and 
the CWA’s legislative history. 
Even before the CWA was enacted, foster caregivers had 
brought § 1983 actions to enforce foster payments to which they 
were entitled under the previous AFDC-FC program. Although 
the CWA does not include an explicit private right of action to 
enforce foster care maintenance payments, Congress was likely 
aware of increasingly common § 1983 litigation when it enacted 
the law.333 Based on the legal context of the CWA’s enactment and 
later legislative history, this Section argues that Congress in-
tended for foster caregivers to be able to bring § 1983 actions to 
enforce their right to foster care maintenance payments. 
One year before the enactment of the CWA, in Miller v 
Youakim,334 the Supreme Court authorized a foster parent to 
bring constitutional and statutory claims under § 1983 in order to 
enforce her right to foster care assistance in accordance with the 
 
 332 See notes 321, 329–40, and accompanying text. 
 333 See Victoria F. Nourse and Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: 
A Congressional Case Study, 77 NYU L Rev 575, 597–605 (2002) (discussing the extent to 
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properly enforced through § 1983 actions. See, for example, Edelman v Jordan, 415 US 
651, 675 (1974) (noting that “suits in federal court under § 1983 are proper to secure com-
pliance with the provisions of the Social Security Act on the part of participating States”). 
 334 440 US 125 (1979). 
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AFDC-FC program.335 The Court observed that, under the AFDC-
FC program, “[a] participating State may not deny assistance to 
persons who meet eligibility standards defined in the Social  
Security Act.”336 The following year, Congress transferred the 
AFDC-FC program, which was previously located in Title IV-A of 
the Social Security Act, to the CWA.337 The eligibility require-
ments for payments under the AFDC-FC program were imported 
into § 672(a) and became the eligibility requirements for foster 
care maintenance payments.338 Although the CWA provided more 
specific language for what foster care maintenance payments 
must cover,339 the statutory provisions regarding eligibility for fos-
ter care maintenance payments did not change significantly when 
the CWA became law. 
The continuity between the AFDC-FC program and the CWA 
and the fact that foster caregivers had already sued under § 1983 
to enforce foster payments suggest that Congress likely antici-
pated that § 1983 actions to enforce foster care maintenance pay-
ments would continue.340 Although Congress did not explicitly 
state that private actions were available under the CWA, it did 
not explicitly foreclose them either. 
The legislative history of the CWA’s enactment is also of little 
help on the question of private enforcement. However, only one 
year before the CWA passed, the Court acknowledged in Cannon 
v University of Chicago341 that it was “not necessary” for a plaintiff 
to show congressional intent to create a private right of action so 
long as a statute confers a class of citizens with a right and does 
not expressly foreclose private enforcement of the right.342 After a 
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 336 See id at 133–34. 
 337 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, HR 3434, 96th Cong, 1st Sess 
in 126 Cong Rec S 14766 (June 13, 1980) (“[The CWA] transfer[s] the existing foster care 
maintenance program from title IV-A to the new title IV-E.”). Recall that the CWA created 
Title IV-E of the SSA. 
 338 See notes 244–52 and accompanying text. 
 339 See text accompanying note 182. 
 340 See note 333 and accompanying text. 
 341 441 US 677 (1979). 
 342 See id at 694 (“[I]n situations . . . ‘in which it is clear that federal law has granted 
a class of persons certain rights, it is not necessary to show an intention to create a private 
cause of action, although an explicit purpose to deny such cause of action would be con-
trolling.’”), quoting Cort v Ash, 422 US 66, 82 (1975). See also Chapman v Houston Welfare 
Rights Organization, 441 US 600, 672 (1979) (White concurring in the judgment) (stating 
that statutory rights may be “protected and vindicated under § 1983 . . . unless there is 
clear indication in a particular statute that its remedial provisions are exclusive or that 
for various other reasons a § 1983 action is inconsistent with congressional intention”). 
2018] “On Behalf of Each Child” 1771 
 
plaintiff shows that a statute creates a right, the burden shifts to 
the state to show that Congress did not intend for the right to be 
privately enforceable under § 1983.343 Gonzaga affirmed this  
burden-shifting rule.344 This context is significant because it im-
plies that Congress was aware that private actions under § 1983 
were commonly initiated to enforce the SSA’s provisions and, in 
particular, the provisions of the AFDC-FC program. Nothing in 
the text or legislative history of the CWA’s enactment indicates 
that Congress intended for the right to such payments to no 
longer be enforceable after passing the CWA. 
Postenactment legislative history further supports the view 
that Congress intended for foster families to be able to enforce the 
CWA’s provisions. Just three years after Congress passed the 
CWA, Senator Alan Cranston, one of the law’s chief architects, 
lamented that many of the CWA’s provisions were not being force-
fully implemented by states. The senator insisted that the CWA’s 
provisions are privately enforceable, arguing that 
the authority granted to the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to withhold or reduce funding to a State for noncom-
pliance was not intended to be an exclusive remedy. . . . [A]s 
my statements on the Senate floor during the several years 
that this legislation was being developed made clear, the in-
tended beneficiaries of [the CWA] were and continue to be 
the children who are in foster care or are in danger of being 
placed in foster care.345 
Foster children are dependent on foster caregivers to use 
these payments to meet their basic needs.346 In most circum-
stances, because of the dependent status of children, enforcing 
any provision of the CWA in court requires that a foster child’s 
 
 343 See note 342. See also Middlesex County Sewage Authority v National Sea  
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caregiver sue on behalf of the child under § 1983.347 Senator 
Cranston stressed that 
[t]here should be no question that these children have stand-
ing to seek enforcement of this law in order to secure the ben-
efits and protections that Congress intended they receive. . . . 
It is sad that it takes a court order to bring that about, but 
that appears to be the only way to achieve faithful execution 
of this law under the [current administration].348 
This postenactment legislative history supports the inference 
that Congress intended for the CWA to create statutory rights 
that are privately enforceable, either directly by foster children 
or, more likely in most cases, by parents and caregivers on behalf 
of children.349 
Because the Court in Suter held the “reasonable efforts” 
provision to be unenforceable under § 1983,350 the CWA’s goal of 
preventing and de-incentivizing unnecessary removals likely 
cannot be fully realized unless Congress decides to act. However, 
the foster care maintenance payment provisions should still be 
enforceable to serve the needs of foster children, to combat the 
problems of multiple placements and foster care drift, and to 
further the CWA’s goal of timely reunification of foster children 
with their families.351 When Congress passed the Suter fix, it did 
not express outright that all provisions of the CWA were privately 
enforceable, but it did imply that at least some, or perhaps most, 
provisions were enforceable through § 1983 actions.352 The 
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legislative history of the Suter fix explains that, “in establishing 
‘State plan’ programs under the Social Security Act, Congress 
meant . . . to permit those injured by State officials’ failure to 
[comply with federal statutory standards] . . . to challenge, 
through appropriate judicial actions, that failure.”353 Ultimately, 
the goal of the Suter fix was “to assure that individuals who have 
been injured by a state’s failure to comply with the state plan 
requirements are able to seek redress in the federal courts.”354 
This strongly indicates that Congress intended provisions of the 
CWA to be enforceable under § 1983. 
CONCLUSION 
While the CWA gives states considerable flexibility to imple-
ment their own foster care systems, it also places firm obligations 
on states. There is no question that the CWA requires states to 
make foster care maintenance payments because § 671(a)(1) con-
ditions federal funding on compliance with § 672 in its entirety. 
Although states are required only to maintain “substantial con-
formity” with the CWA’s provisions to avoid a loss of funding, the 
individually tailored language in § 672(a)(1) suggests that state 
compliance is not the focus of the foster care provision. The lan-
guage in § 675(4)(A) is specific about the costs that foster care 
maintenance payments must cover, and states that receive fed-
eral funding under the CWA must ensure that the payments they 
provide to foster caregivers cover all of these costs. Moreover, 
states are not free to decide which foster caregivers can receive 
foster care maintenance payments. Taken together, § 672(a)(1) 
and § 675(4)(A) go to great lengths to instruct states on the spe-
cific duties they must fulfill “on behalf of each child” eligible for 
assistance. 
Section 1983 enforcement of the CWA’s right to foster care 
maintenance payments is crucial for preventing § 672(a)(1) from 
becoming a “dead letter.”355 The CWA does not explicitly provide 
aggrieved parties with a private right of action to enforce its pro-
visions, and there is no federal review mechanism to fill this gap. 
Asking the federal government to terminate funding to a state for 
its failure to make adequate foster care maintenance payments 
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would most likely exacerbate the problem that foster caregivers 
are trying to remedy. Thus, § 1983 actions are the most sensible 
avenue for foster caregivers to enforce their right to adequate fos-
ter care maintenance payments and to ensure that the CWA pro-
tects the interests of children. 
It is important not to lose sight of the lives that are affected 
when states fail to comply with provisions of the CWA. Like any 
other Spending Clause legislation that creates a federal-state co-
operative program, the CWA surely regulates states by tying 
funding to state compliance. But to reduce the entire statute to a 
mere regulatory regime misses the point. As the name of the law 
suggests, the overarching goal of the CWA is to improve the wel-
fare of some of the most vulnerable children in the United States. 
Foster children are undeniably the ones who suffer most when a 
state fails to make adequate foster care maintenance payments, 
and foster caregivers should be permitted to sue under § 1983 to 
prevent this suffering. “[A]fter all,” Justice Blackmun admon-
ished in his Suter dissent, “we are dealing here with children.”356 
 
 356 Suter, 503 US at 377 (Blackmun dissenting). 
